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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,

the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter "ADJ"), the Trial
Court Admillistrator and his assistant (hereinafter "TCA") (collectively "the Fourth District")
from the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction issued by the district court following its
decision on cross motions for summary judgment, which enjoins enforcement of certain sectlons
of the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter "Guidelines")

B.

Statement of Facts
The Plaintiff-Respondents -Two Jinn, Inc., which does business as Aladdin Bail Bonds

and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Aladdin") and two bail agents employed by Aladdin,
James' Garske and Shantara Carlock (collectively "Bail Plaintiffs")

-

are licensed bail agents. R.

(Vol. TI) pg 276-77, '1[2, 6-8lAppellatc Exhibit ("App. Exli.") 32, pg. 5;' App. Exh. 45 (Garske
Affidavit 10-1-08) $4, Exh. A. Bail agents are licensed to solicit and transact bail with the
general publlc on behalf of a surety insure1 whlch appoints them to execute its ball bond. See
I.C. $5 41-1038(1), 41-1039. To secure their licences through the Idaho Department of Ilisurance
(hereinafter "DOI"), bail agents are required to complete a ci-iminal history check, to undergo a
character and fitness evaluation, and to maintain a surety performance bond of $15,000 for the
benefit and protection of the public against acts of fraud or dishonesty. R. (Vol. II) pg 278-79, 'j[

' For purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue in this appeal, the Fourth
District conceded a number of facts alleged in the Bail Plaintiffs' amended complaint. App. Exh.
32 (Memo Re Summary Judgment) pg. 5. In this brief, those facts will be referenced by a joint
citation to the amended complaint (R. (Vol. TI) pg. 275- 294) and page five of Fourth District's
summary judgment memorandum (App. Exh. 32).

18-19,251App. Exh. 32, pg. 5; see also LC. $9 41-1006-07,41-1016,41-1039,41-1040.
Aladd~n1s an independent contractor for two surety companies who have authorized it to
execute and del~verball bonds to secure the release of cr~mmaldelendants on the suret~es'
behalf. App. Exh. 37 (Peter Botz Aff~davit)'j[ 3 & 5, Exh. A-1 & Exh. B-1 . Through the efforts
of its individual bail agent employees such as Ms. Carlock, Aladdin binds one of its sureties to
pay the amount of the posted bond in the event the c11mna1delendant falls to appear as ordered.
Id. As part of its contract with its sureties, Aladdin provides claims handling services, including

hiring investigators to locate and apprehend bail fugitives and retaining legal counsel to prepare,
file and argue legal motions for exoneration of forfeited bonds. Id. at 94. The job duties of
individual Aladdin bail agents, such as Ms. Carlock, include initial contact with the criminal
defendants and others in order to conduct a risk assessment. App. Exh. 45 (James Garslce
Affidavit 10-1-08) 95. Unlike Aladdin, individual Aladdin bail agents retain no part of the
premium for posted bonds, have no involvement in the case after the bond is posted and are
salaried, at-will employees. R. (Vol. LU) pg. 456; App. Exh. 45 (Garske Affidavit 10-1-08) 'j[ 5;
App. Exh. 52 (Garske Affidavit 11-10-08) ¶ 3.
The Guidelines require all individual bail agents such as Mr. Garske and Ms. Carlock to
apply for placement on an authorized list of bail agents maintained by the TCA (hereinafter
"authorized list"). R. (Vol. TI) pg. 350. The Guidelines make no attempt to approve sureties or
bail bond companies such as Aladdin and, instead, their scope is strictly limited to the regulation
of individual bail agents and supervising bail agents. R. (Vol. m)pg. 465
As part of the apphcation for placement on the authorized hst, individual bail agents must
undergo another character and fitness evaluation like that conducted by the DOI. R. (Vol. Ti) pg

279-80, ql251Exh. 32, pg. 5; R. (Vol. II) pg. 269. The grounds for refusing to issue, suspending
or revolung a produce]- license issued by the DO1 are substantially identical to the grounds under
which the TCA can refuse to place a bail agent on the authorized list or can petition for an
agent's removal from the authorized list. Compare I.C. § 41-1016(l)(f) with R. (Vol. II) pg. 358
(Guidelines § I I ,111.A) (describing criminal history that is grounds for license discipline or to
disqual~fyor remove ball agent from authorized llst); LC. § 41-1016(1)(f) with R. (Vol. E) pg.
362 (Guidelines

1I.III.A(I) & (2)) (providing for discipline where bail agent pled guilty to any

felony or to a misdemeanor evidencing dishonesty); I.C. 9 41 -1016(l)(h) with R. (Vol. IT)
(Ouidelines $ 14.I.A(9)) pg. 362 (providing for bail agent discipline where bail agent has used
fraudulent or dishonest practices or shown self to be incompetent, untrustworthy or source of
injury).
In contrast to the statutory definition of bail agent, the Guidelines define individual bail
agents such as Mr. Garske and Ms. Carloclc as "the responsible party to ensure that a forfeited
bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the right of the state or county to pursue collection of a
forfeited bond from the insurance company and notwithstanding any agreement between the bail
agent and the insurance agency." R. (Vol. 11) pg. 347. Section 17 of the Guidelines provides that
a "ball agent" must surrender the defendant, "pay thc Clerk of the Court the full amount of the
forfeited bond" or file a sufficient motion to exonerate. Id. at 368. An individual bail agent who
fails to do so will no longer be permitted to work in the Fourth Judicial District. Id. at 363-64
(Guidelines

3 14.1.B(1)). This "responsibility"

follows an individual bail agent even if he or she

leaves employment with the bail company for which the bond was posted. See R. Vol. IT pg 284,

91 46iApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5; see also R. (Vol. IT) pg. 363 (Guidelines § 14(I)(A)(16)) (grounds to

remove bail agent from authorized list when the agent "has not satisfietl all obligations to any
court incurred while working with another bail agency"). Thus, a bail agent who leaves
employment with another bail bond company and begins employment with Aladdin will be
prohibited from working in the Fourth Judicial District if the other company's surety fails to pay
the forfeiture of the bond which the agent posted for the other company prior to employment with
Al'addin. See R. (Vol. I) pg. 100-107 (Petition Re Sunshine Musick); App. Exh. 3 (TCA's Memo
Re Motion to Consolidate 6-25-07); App. Exh. 4 (Diane R u ~ ~ eAffidavit
ll
6-27-07); App. Exh.
24 (Heather Bedal Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. A; App. Exh. 31 (McKay Affidavit 9-5-08), Exh. G.
These Guidelines have the effect of requiring individual bail agents, in their personal capacity, to
serve as a secondary surety. R. (Vol. EI)pg. 477.
Acting pursuant to the Guidelines, the TCA refuses to place bail agents who are duly
licensed by the DO1 on the authorized list. R. (Vol. U) pg. 280, 'j[28lApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. When
the TCA refuses to place a bail agent on the authorized list, that agent must petition the ADJ for
placement on the list, pay a filing fee and wait Cor a hearing date, which is often several weeks
31-321App. Exh. 32, pg. 5; see also
from the date the petition is filed. R. (Vol. U) pg. 281, I[
A p p Exh. 25 (McKay Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. B & C.
For example, Ms. Carlock worked for Aladdin as a bail agent in other judicial districts
before moving to the Boise area. R. (Vol. II)pg. 277, $ 7 , pg. 281,7[ 32iApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. On
November 23, 2007, she applied for placement on the authorized list, which the TCA denied
based upon Ms. Carlock's pulported "failure" to disclose on her bail agent application a juvenile
proceeding that had been dismissed approximately seven years earlier. Id. On December 12,
2007, Ms. Carlock, through counsel, filed a petition with the court, together with the required

filing fee, requesting review of this denial and a prompt hearing. Id. A hearing'was scheduled
and held on January 9, 2008, at which the ?CABSoffice, represented by the Ada County
Prosecuting Attorney, advised the ADJ that it no longer objected to Ms. Carlock's placement on
the authorized list. R. (Vol. E) pg. 281, Y[ 321App. Exh. 32, pg. 5; App. Exh. 25 (McKay
Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. A (Tr. CarlocWGalindo Hearing 1-9-08), p. 6, In. 22 - p. 7, In. 6.
Because the TCA withdrew its objection, Ms. Carlock was added tothe authorized list on or
about the following day, over six weeks after she initially applied for placement. App. Exh. 25
(McKay Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. A (Tr. CarlocWGalindo Hearing 1-9-08), p. 7, In. 10-12, p. 9,
In. 6-9. The ADJ nonetheless cautioned Aladdin to be sure to include even dismissed juvenile
offenses in the future because "we want to Itnow everything about [bail agents'] history." id. at
p. 7, In. 19-21; see also id.at p. 8, In. 11-14 (Court: But if you would just let Aladdin know,
make sure they put everything down and not to think because it's juvenile that they don't have to
include it").
Another example is Justin Davis, also a duly licensed Aladdin bail agent who had been
successf~~lly
posting bonds in another judicial district, whom the TCA refused to place on the
authorized list. See App. Exh. 16 (McKay Affidavit 11-16-07) Exh. 1. After receiving his DO1
license in May 2007, Mr. Davis submitted application$ for placement on the approved list of bail
agents in the Third and Fourth Judicial Districts. Id.at Exh. 3 (Justin Davis Affidavit) 11 5. The
Third Judicial District placed Mr. Davis on its list of bail agents and Mr. Davis began posting
bonds in Canyon County. Id,at 11 6.
Conversely, the TCA denied Mr. Davis's application because:

[Mr. Davis was] charged with misdemeanor Petit Theft in Canyon County in

December of 2000. [Mr. Davis] pled guilty to the amended charge of Willful
Concealment and received a withheld judgment in May of 2001. Additionally,
this information was not disclosed as requiredon page 3 of the application.

'

Id. at Exh. C (8-21-07 Letter from TCA). As a result, Mr. Davis was compelled to file a
Petition, through counsel, pay a filing fee and wait for a hearing date before his name could be
added to the list. See App. Exh. 16 (McKay Affidavit 11-16-07) Exh. 1 (Petition). In an
affidavit supporting his Petition, Mr. Davis explained how, at the age of nineteen, he had been
charged with petit theft with regard to a $50 pair of binoculars from WalMart. Id. at Exh. 3
(Davis Affidavit) 'J 7. Mr. Davis pled guilty to the amended charge of willful concealment and
was granted a withheld judgment. Id
Mr. Davis also explained, in his sworn affidavit, that he did not disclose the theft charge
because he misunderstood the pertinent question and believed he was supposed to disclose
misdemeanor charges that incurred in the past five years. Id. at $8. Mr. Davis had no intent to
deceive tlie TCA and, indeed, believed the TCA would discover the charge through the criminal
~ Mr. Davis co~npletecl
history check that he submitted to as part of the application p r o c e s ~ .Id.
his application without the assistance of counsel and was simply confused by the multi-part
question. See App. Exh. 16 (McKay Affidavit 11-16-07) Exh. 5 (Tr. Davis Hearing 10-10-07) p.
6, In. 11-22, Further, Mr. Davis is a responsible hiisband and father who has been steadily
employed and furthered his education since receiving a withheld judgment for willful
concealment. See App. Exh. 16 (McICay Affidavit 11-16-07) Exh. 3 (Davis Affidavit) 'J 10-12.
At the hearing on Mr. Davis's petition, the ADJ indicated that the application question

Mr. Davis, of course, had successfully passed a criminal history check in connection to
his license through tlie DOT.
6

asking the prospective bail agent to list their criminal history was "clear" and, thus, Mr. Davis
must have intentionally misrepresented his criminal history. App. Exh. 16 (McKay Affidavit 1116-07) Exh. 5 (Tr. Davis Hearing 10-10-07) p. 8, in. 14-25. The ADJ reasoned that this
misrepresentation together with the theft charge caused her concern regarding Mr. Davis's
integrity and honesty. Id. The Ada County Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the TCA argued
that a charge of theft within ten years "illustrates something about [Mr. Davis's] character that
has to be of concern to the Trial Court Administrator when a person's acting as a bail agent." Id.
at p. 10, in. 13-18. After Mr. Davis explained to the ADJ that he "honestly made a mistake on
the application" the ADJ responded "so also he does not pay attention to detail." Id. at p. 13, in.
13-14. The ADJ then inquiredwhy Mr. Davis could not just continue working in the Third
Judicial District instead of the FourthJudicial District. Id. at p. 15-16, in. 3-14. Ultimately, the
ADJ determined that Mr. Davis could be added to the list of authorized agents if he would agree
to a "probationary period" and that he would be sribject to removal after two "violations" of the
G~~idelines.~
In addition to rclt~singto place licensed agents on the authorized list, the TCA has
utilized the Guidelines to remove Mr. Garske and other Aladdin bail agents from the authorized
list on several occasions. R. (Vol. II) pg. 285, Y[ 51lApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. On one occasion, the
TCA removed Mr. Garslte and thirty-eight other Aladdin bail agents from the authorized list on
the Friday prior to a holiday weekend based on the TCA's belief that Mr. Garske had failed to
submit to a criminal history check as part of the Guidelines' application renewal process. R.

' The Guidelines make no provision for a "probationary" period for a bail agent or for the
removal of a bail agent after two or more "violations" of those Guidelines.

(Vol. 11) pg. 285, ¶ 50. As a result, Mr. Garske andthese bail agents were deprived of their right
to practice their profession within the Fourth District for four days. Id. Although some of the
other Idaho judicial districts in which Aladdin conducts its business have implemented bail bond
guidelines, no other judicial district has utilized the guidelines' operation to terminate or threaten
to terminate the ability of Aladdin bail agents to post bonds in those districts. R. (Vol. II) pg.
287, fl621App. Exh. 32, pg. 5.

C.

General Course of Proceedings
On April 12, 2007, the Bail Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief pursuant to

LC. $ 10-1201. challenging the lawfulness of the Guidelines' imposition of individual
responsibility on and regulation of bail agents. R. (Vol. I) pg. 11-93. The Bail Plaintiffs asked
the district court to declare that the sections of the Guidelines imposing responsibility for
forfeited bonds on individual bail agents and requiring agents to submitto a character and fitness
evaluation violate separation of powers, due process and other provisions of law. Id. at pg. 30.
The Bail Plaintiffs asked the district court to enjoin the future enforcement of the pertinent
sections of the Guidelines. Id.
At the outset, the Fourth District moved to dismiss or, alte~nativelyfor summary
judgment and the Bail I'laintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 94-99, 108-1 10. On
December 12, 2007, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order in which it denied
the Fourth District's motion to dismiss and the Bail Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
inj~mction. R. (Vol. II) pg. 258-274. The district court concluded that although the Bail
Plaintiffs raised triable issues with respect to the lawf~~lness
of the Guidelines, they had not
shown the risk of irreparable injury or a clear entitlement to relief. Id. at 273.

'

The Bail Plaintiffs amended their complaint and, among other matters, replaced former

Aladdin agent Rebecca ~'alinaswith Aladdin bail agent Shantara Carlock as Plaintiff in this
action. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 275-297. The Fourth District filed an answer, R. (Vol. 11) pg. 298-31 I ,
and asked the district court to reconsider its December 2007 ruling or to dismiss the action. R.
(Vol. 11) pg. 312-330; see also App. Exh. 21-27. A decision on the Fourth District's motions
was held in abeyance pending the anticipated filing of cross motions for summary judgment.
App. Exh. 32, pg. 3. On September 5, 2008, the parties filed their cross motions for summary
judgment which were supported by various memoranda and affidavits. R. (Vol. II) pg. 331-32,
337-338; App. Exh. 28-53. On September 18,2008, the parties, by stipulation, placed into the
record new, revised Guidelines that replaced the Guidelines tliat had previously been submitted.

R. (Vol. I) pg. 137- 138; R. (Vol. 11) pg. 340-41.4
The cross motions for summary judgment were heard by the district court on October 17,
2008. Tr. (10-17-2008). On Febr~lary6, 2009, the district court. issued a memosandurn opinion
and order, which denied the Fourth District's motion for summary judgment ancl granted the Bail
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in large part. R.(Vol. 111) pg. 446-490. On March 31,
2009, the district court issued a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction pursuant to its
opinion and order enjoining further enforcement of the unlawful sections of the Guidelines. R .
(Vol. III) pg. 491-498. The ADJ promulgated new Guidelines to comply with the declaratory

4Although the Foulth Judicial District signed these revised Guidelines into effect on
August 22,2008, the attorneys for neither party was awai-e that new Guidelines had been
implemented at the time they filed their respective motions for summary judgment. R. (Vol. 11)
pg 340. The revised Guidelines did not address the dispute between the parties. See R. (Vol. ILI)
pg 457. The palties agreed that the revised Guidelines would be the Guidelines the district court
should consider in ruling on the parties respective motions For summary judgment. R. (Vol. 11)
pg 340.

judgment and permanent injunction, which included a section allowing the TCA to prevent bail
agents from postlng bonds on behalf of a surety that has ta11cd to t~melypay a folfelture. R. (Vol

M) pg. 520-21, 541, 547. The ADJ thereafter suspended enforcement of those new guldel~nesso
as not to moot the question of whether the Fourth District could impose personal responsibility
on individual ball agents and conduct character and fitness evaluat~onsof those agents
Appellant's Brief pg. I , n.1; see also App. Exh. 54, Exh. 1. The Fourth Judicial District timely
appealed from the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction and the Bail Plaintiffs timely
cross-appealed. R. (Vol. IU)pg. 551-64

111. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Fourth Distr~ctstates the issues on appeal as:

I.

Do the Bail Band Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District exceed the authority

of the Administrative District Judge to establish guidelines regarding posting, forfeiture,
exoneration and all other matters relating to bonds?

2.

Do the Bail Bond Guidelines constitute a judicial exercise of legislative a~ithority

in violation of the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers doctrine?
Aladdin rephrases the issues as:

I.

Did the district court co~~ectlydetermine
that the Guidelines adopted by the

Fourth District unlawfully exceeded the ADJ's administrative supervision and authority over the
operation of the district court?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of

review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.

Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogla~zd,147 Idaho 774,779,215 P.3d 494,499 (2009); P.O.
Ventures, Inc. v. Louclcs Fanzily Irrevocable Tr~tst,144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P.3d 870, 874
(2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ~R.c.P.56(c).
In this appeal, the Fourth District does not contend that the district court erred in granting
the Bail Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because there was an issue of material fact
Instead, the Fourth District asks this Court "to issue a declaratory judgment in favor of
Defendants that the Fourth Judicial District's Bail Bond Guidelines do not violate any of
Plaintiff's constitiitional or statutory rights." Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The essence of the Fourth
District's argument appears to be that, alrhoLgh there al-e no issues of fact, the district court
should have granted its motion for suminary judgment, rather than the Bail Plaintiffs' motion.
Therefore, on appeal, this Court exercises free review over the entire record that was before the
district court in order to determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Lowder v. Mirziiloka Courzty Joiizt School Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 837, 979 P.2d 1192,

B.

The District Court Correctly Determined That the Guidelines Exceed the Authority
of the ADJ to Adopt Procedural Bail Bond Guidelines.
Neither the ADJ's "administrative supervision and authority over the operation of the

district courts" pursuant to I.C. $ 1-907 nor the judiciary's inherent authority over matters of
procedure extends to the authority to abridge, enlarge or modify substantive r~ghts.See I.C. 5 1-

213 Qud~clalrules shall nelther abr~dge,enlarge nor modlfy the subslantlve rlghts of any lltzgant);
Iiz re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,255 912 P.2d 614,623 (1995) (Artlcle U of the
Idaho Constitution prohibits the judiciary from improperly invading the province of the
Legislature). The Guidelines condition bail agents' ability to work in the Fourth District on their
agreement to become co-sureties in their individual capacities on the bonds they execute and on
submitting to an extensive character and fitness evaluation. This imposition of individual
responsibility on and extensive regulation of bail agents are not provided for by law, are
substantive in nature and lack a nexus with the operation of the coul-ls. Therefore, the district
court correctly concluded that the sections of the Guidelines dealing with those matters are an
unlawful exercise of the ADJ's authority pursuant to I.C. $3 1-907, 1-213 and the Idaho
Constitution.
In this appeal, the Fourth District complains tikt it has been deprived of the ability to
regulate bail agents with whom it "transact[s] business" and that the district court has compelled
it to do business with bail agents in whom it has no confidence, including felons. Appellant's
Brief, pg. 5-6, 27. The Fourth District f~irtherasserts that it must be able to require individual
bail agents to be responsible fol- the bonds they execute so that the court has recourse if a surety
fails to pay. Id. at pg. 27. As disc~issedmore fully below, the Fo~trthDistrict's arguments are
unpersuasive and this Court should affirm the district court's declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction.
The offending Guidelines appear to be a byproduct of the Fourth District's view that
surety bail bonds are not sufficient means to ensure the presence of the accused released on bail.
However, both Idaho statute and court rules recognize that a surety insurance company, duly

certified by the DOI, is authorized to becoine the sole surety on bail bonds issued in connection
with judicial proceedings. Further, the Fourth District does not "transact bail bond business" and
the legislature, in an exercise of its police power, properly provided for the regulation of bail
agents for the protection of the public, including the authority bestowed on the DO1 to revoke or
refuse to issue a felon's bail agent license. Finally, the district coult held that the Foulth District
could create guidelines that provided for the removal of a surety who has defaulted on an owing
forfeiture. Thus, the district court's ruling certainly did not leave the Fourth District in the
helpless position which it describes.
The Guidelines' extensive pre-al~provalprocess for, and regulation of, licensed bail
agents does not set forth the mechanical operations by which bail and bail bond contracts are
efectuated and, therefore, exceeds the authority of the judiciary's authority to make procedural
rules. 'Instead, the Guidelines invade the province of the legislature to enact law and create
substantive obligations. The Guidelines further violate separation of powers by abridging and
regulating the substantive interests in occupational liberty and in having the license issued by the
DO1 and an appointment by a certified surety considefed presumptively sufficient qualification to
execute bail bonds.' Finally, because the Guidelines conflict with S~lpremeCourt rules
In the context of its argument that the courts have the inherent authority to regulate bail
agents, the Fourth District argues that the district court erred in concluding that placement on the
authorized list is protected by procedural due process. Appellant's Brief pg. 16-19. However,
the judiciary's rule-making authority does not extend to the authority to abridge substantive
interests regardless of whether those interests are protected liberty or property interests for
purposes of procedural due process. Conversely, even if the Guidelines' regulation of bail agents
is an appropriate exercise of the ADJ's authority, the Fourth District, as an arm of the state
government, cannot deprive protected interests without due process. Thus, the issue of whether
the Guidelines abridge substantive interests is distinct from whether there is a due process
interest in placement on the authorized list. Because the Bail Plaintiffs challenge the district
court's conclusion that the Guidelines provide adequate procedural due process in their cross-

'

recognizing that a criminal defendant may post bail by purchasing a bail bond issued by an
authorized corporate suret.y,the Guidelines' bail agent regulation is outside the ADJ's authority
even if such regulation would otherwise be an appropriate exercise of judicial authority.
Because the district court correctly concluded that the Guidelines exceed the ADJ's authority to
promulgate procedural guidelines, this Court should affirm the district cou~t'sdeclaratory
judgment and permanent i n j u n ~ t i o n . ~

1.

The authority of the ADJ and the judiciary

The administrative judge in each judicial district, subject to the rules of the Supreme
Court, has " administrative supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and
magistrates in the district." LC. 9 1-907. This authority encompasses, but is not limited to,
enumerated duties such as calendaring, supervising clerks, and assigning magistrates. Id. On
August 4,2005, the Iclaho Supreme Court sct forth the ADJ's job description and authorized
"guidelines" for bail bonds. R. (Vol. UI) pg. 625-27. The duties listed in I.C. 9 1-907 and the
job description illustrate the type of functions that relate to the operation of the courts. These
duties include judicial scheduling, calendaring, supervising clerks, assigning magistrates, and

appeal, arguments responsive to the Fourth District's assertion that the Bail Plaintiffs do not have
a protected interest are set foi-th in the contemporaneously filed cross-appellant's brief.
Through this litigation, the Bail Plaintiffs also challenged the TCA's conduct in acting
as a party to forfeiture proceedings and commenting on and assisti~igthe prosecuting attorney
with various motions for relief from forfeiture. R. (Vol. M) pg. 458, 486-489. The district court
declared that it is inappropriate for the TCA to act as a party in bail motions, be perceived as a
paity or advocate for or against exoneration of forfeiture. R. (Vol. HI) pg.496. The district court
thus enjoined sections of the guidelines requiring the signature of the TCA as a party and
prohibited the TCA from providing comments on exoneration motions that go beyond
confirming the time line and suppoltirig information. Id. at pg.496-98. The Fourth District does
not challenge this poltion of the declaratory judgment and permanent inj~~nction
on appeal. See
Appellant's BrieE.

mailitaining security and efficiency of court facilities. Similarly, the Supreme Court described
the ADJ's duties to include fostering relationships with county and local officials to secure
funding, supervising court calendars and caseloads, addressing methods to improve the
administration of justice, and supervising the court's daily operations.
Bail bond guidelines that set forth the mechanical operations by which the bail bond
contract was effectuated are an appropriate exercise of the ADJ's authority pursuant to I.C. 5 1907. For instance, the maintenance of an authorized list of sureties and bail agents is an
administrative efficiency and an appropriate exercise of the ADJ's authority. R. (Vol. II) pg
269; R. (Vol.

m)pg. 479. Similarly, some Guidelines, such as those regulating bail agents'

conduct in the courthouse, are within the purview of the ADJ's administrative authority. See R.
(Vol. 11) pg. 354-545 (Section 8, prohibiting bail agents from soliciting in court facilities and
Section 9, requiring the approval or assistance oE court security in attempting to take individuals
into c~istodywhile in a court facility).
However, bail bond guidelines cannot exceed the judiciary's inherent power to make
rules goveining the mechanical operations of the courts, by which substantive law, rights and
remedies are effectuated. See Idaho Const. art. 2, 5 1; art. 5, 5 2; art. 5, 5 13; I.C. 5 1-213; State
v. Currirzgtoiz, 108 ldaho 539,541,700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985). The ADJ's authority to create

guidelines, lilte the right of courts to promulgate rules regarding practice and procedure, docs not
extend to the right to abrogate or modify a substantive rule of law. See I.C. 5 1-214; In re SRBA

Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255 912 P.2d at 623. Moreover, the ADJ's authority is subject to
the rules of the Supreme Court. 1.C. 5 1-907.

2.

Bail, bail bonds and bail bond agents.

Admssron to ball is the order of a competent court that the defendant shall be released
from actual custody of the sheriff upon posting bail. I.C. 3 19-2906. Fixing bail relates to the
manner 01ensurlng that the alleged offense will be heard by the court and, thus, is a proccd~~ral
matter within the inherent discretion uf the courts. Curvilzgton, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at
944. In exercise of its discretion, a court determines the amount and conditions of bail after
considering a number of factors relevant to the defendant's likelihood of appearing as ordered
and risk of posing a safety threat to the community if released from custody. See I.C.R. 46(c)
For certain misdemeanors, bail is set pursuant to a schedule. Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule
("I.M.C.R.") 13.
A criminal defendant may post bail by:

filing sufficient sureties with the court, as required by the court, to ensure the
defendant's appearance. Sufficient sureties shall consist of any one (1) of the
following:
(a) A bail bond;
(b) A property boncl; or
(c) A cash deposit.
I.C. ?j 19-2907(1); see also I.C.R. 46(f)(l) ("Bail may be posted in the form of cash deposit,
property bond, or a bail bond issued by a surety insurance company qualified by law to do
business in the state of Idaho").
The court's discretion to fix bail does not extend to the authority to require that bond be
posted by a particular form of "sufficient sul-ety." See LC. § 19-2907(2) ("Although bail may be
posted in the form of a cash deposit pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a
defendant shall not be required to post bail in the form of a cash deposit"); I.C.R. 46(f)(1) ("The
I6

court shall not require that bail be posted only in cash, nor shall the court specify differing
amounts for bail depending upon whether it is posted in the form of cash deposit, a property
bond, or a bail bond").
The first method by which a defendant may elect to post bail, a bail bond, "is a suretyship
contract between the state on one side and an accused and his or her surety 011the other side,
whereby the surety guarantees the appearance of an accused." State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds,
131 Idaho 113, 116,952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1.998). The reference to "state" as a party to
the bail bond contract refers to the same party that is the plaintiff in the criminal action against
the defendant and does not refer to the court. R. (Vol. ID) pg. 483. Surety companies meeting
requireme~~ts
set forth by the DO1 are authorized to become the sole surety on bail bonds. 1.C. 3
41-2604. Ail courts and judges "shall accept and treat such bond" as "fully and completely
complying" with the requirements of law. I C . 3 41-2604. Bail agents are licensed to solicit and
transact bail with the general public on behalf of a surety, which appoints them to execute its bail
bonds. See I.C. S 41-1038(1). In so doing, the bail agent binds the surety to pay the face amount
of the bond if the defendant falls to appear in court
3.

The Guidelines' imposition of responsibility on bail agents in their individual
capacities is unlawful pursuant to I.C. $5 1-907,1-213and the Idaho
Constitution.

The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive laws in the Legislature. In re

SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,255 912 P.2d 614,623 (1995), citing Idaho Const. art. KI,

5 1.

The judiciary's rule making power thus goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules

In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255 912 P.2d at 623; State v. Beanz, 121 Idaho 862,
863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992); see also I.C. $5 1-212, 1-213. Substantive law prescribes norms

.

for societal conduct and punishnients for violations thereof by creating, defining and regulating
primary rights whereas procedural rules are those pertaining to the mechanical operation of the
cours by which substantive laws, rights and remedies are remedied: Currington, 108 Idaho at

The Guidelines define individual bail agents as the "responsible party to ensure that a
forfeited bond is timely paid." R. (Vol. II) pg. 347. This imposition ofindividual responsibility
on a bail agent, which is not provided o r by law, constitutes a substantive obligation. The ADJ's
authority over the operation of the courts does not extend to the right to prevent bail agents from
executing bail bonds on behalf of the surety unless they enter into a separate agreement whereby
they agree to provide additional services to the court by accepting the imposition of individual
responsibility for posted bonds. Further, the obligations imposed on bail agents by the
Guidelines conflict with Idaho statutes and riiles providing that only corporate sureties are
authorized to be the surety on a baii bond. Accoi.dingly, the district court correctly enjoined
enforcement of those sections of the Guidelines imposing individual responsibility on bail
agents.

a.

the district court correctly determined that the imposition of
responsibility on individual bail agents is beyond the ADJ's authority
concerning matters of procedure.

Once a courl has ordered that a crlmmal defendant may be released on ball, the defendant
may elect to post that bail through a bail bond. See I.C. 1) 19-2907(1). As noted by the district
court in its February 6,2009 memorandum opinion and order, "given the corporate nature of the
surety ins~rrancecompanies authorized to issue bail bonds, they must of necessity act through
agents, i.e. bail agencies and baii agents." R. (Vol. III) pg. 457. The district court noted that "the

relationsh~pof a bail bond agency to the surety and the relat~onsh~p
of a bail agent to the bail
bond agency and to the surety are all grounded in agency law and are each that of an agent to a
d~sclosedprinc~pal" R. (Vol.

m)pg. 454

"Absent prov~sionsin the agreement between 1) the

surety and the bail bond agency; 2) the surety and the bail agent; 3) the bail bond agency and the
bail agent; 4) the principal (the accused) and the bail bond agency; 5) the principal and the surety;
andlor 6) the principal and the bail agent, neither the bail bond agency [Aladdin] nor the bail
agent [Garske or Carlock) is a party" to this suretyship contract. R. (Vol. m)pg. 456
The Guidelines nevertheless define a "bail agent" as "the bail . . [flor purposes 01these
Guidelines, the bail agent is considered the responsible party to ensure that a forfeited bond is
timely paid, notwithstanding the right of the state or county to pursue collection of a forfeited
bond from the insurailce company, and notwithstanding any agreement between the bail agent
and the insurance company." R. (Vol. 11) pg. 347. This definition is contrary to established law
regarding surety bail bonds. As the district court noted, "the term 'bail' has a settled legal
meaning . . . as the surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by
becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated." R. (Vol. III) pg. 476,

citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4"' Ed.). When Aladdin posts a bail bond on behalf of
tbe surety company, it is the surety company, not Aladdin or its individual employees, that
becomes the "bail" by agreeing to be responsible for the defendant's appearance. See App. Exh.

37 (Botz Affidavit) Exh. A-1 & Exh. B-1.
The district court reasoned that "the general rule under agency law as applied to bail
bonds 1s stated in CJS Bail

3 254 that 'A party will not be personally liable on a bail bond where

he or she executes bond documents for the surety in a representative capacity."' R. (Vol. III) pg

476. The Guidelines, in making the bail agent the "responsible party to ensure a forfeited bond is
paid," define the individual bail agent as the surety. R. (Vol. III) pg. 476. "This definitional
change creates a substantive obligation on the bail agent and attempts to vest the bail agent with
the common law rights and obligations of a surety7 . . . This is not a procedural rule but a
substantive rule." R. (Vol. IU) pg. 476. "The substantive change of the bail agent's status from
that of an agent of a disclosed principal to that of a principal has led to most of the problems
facing the parties in this litigation." R. (Vol. IU)pg. 476.
Additionally, as found by the district court, by making the individual bail agent a cosurety, the Guidelines violate Idaho statutes pertaining to surety insurers. R. (Vol. ItI) pg. 477.
Pursuant to Idaho Code, surety insurance includes guaranteeing bonds and any person is
prohibited from acting as a surety insurer unless duly certified. See I.C. §§ 41-305 41-507(3). A
bond posted by a surety that 1s so author~zedmust be treated as fully complymg with the law
I.C. § 41-2604. The Guidelines' imposition of substantive responsibility on individ~ialbail
agents conflicts with these statutes and, therefore, violates separation of powers
Based on its conclusion that the ADJ lacks authority to condition individual bail agents'
'The view that the individual bail agent, rather than the corporate surety, is the "bail"
appears to be a holdover from the interpretation of the word "person" contained inthe former I.C.
5 19-2927 as it existed prior to the July 2007 amendments. See R. (Vol. 111) pg. 581, p. 7,111.24 p. 8, in. 2; App. Exh. 25 (McKay Affidavit 8-21-2008), Exh. I(2004 letter from Judge
Williamson) & Exh. J (district court decision from 2006 setting forth the state's position that
Section 19-2927 required the bail to be a natural person instead of an entity). Whatever question
remained whether a surety could be the "bail" was resolved legislatively in July 2007, when LC.
19-2927 was amended to clarify that "if the bail consists of a surety bond, [notice of forfeiture
must be mailed] to the surety or its designated agent." See also R. (Vol, ItI) pg. 581, p. 8, in. 213. Both the legislature and the Supreme Court again affirmed that the corporate surety is the
"bail" in the 2009 enactment of the Idalio Bail Act and the 2009 revisions to I.C.R. 46. Despite
these amendments, however, the Fo111thDistrict continues to assert that it has the authority to
impose individual responsibility on bail agents

ability to work in the Fou~thDistrict on their agreement to adcept individual responsibility for the
bonds which they sell, the district court declared tbat the Fourth District lacks the authority to:
a.

Define "bail agents" as the responsible party to ensure that a forfeited bond
is timely paid, as set forth in Section 1 of the Guidelines;

j.

Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent for nonpayment of a forfeited bond
and permit the TCA to issue "violations" of the Guidelines for such
nonpayment as set forth in Section 14.I.B(1) & (2) of the Bail Bond
Guidelines;

k.

Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent from the authorized list because a
financial institution has failed to pay a check written by tbat bail agent f o ~
a forfeited bond as set forth in Section 14.1.C(2)of the Bail Bond
Guidelines:

1.

Require bail agents to surrender the defendant, pay a forfeited bond or file
a sufficient motion for exoneration within 180 days following- forfeiture as
set fosth in Section 17 of the Bail Bond Guidelines; and

m.

Require that only the individual hail agent who offered the bail bond for
acceptance, the supervising agent or an attoilley acting on the individual
agent's behalf sign bail-related documents that are filed with the Court as
set forth in Section 22 o% the Bail Bond Guidelines.

R. (Vol. a)pg. 493,495
The district court also declared that the Fourth District may implement Guidelines that
permit them to "refuse a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized list and to seek
the bail agent's removal from the list where the surety on whose behalf the bail agent is currently
seeking to post bonds has an outstanding forfeiture, is precluded from issuing bonds or is
financially insolvent." R. (Vol. III) pg. 496. Thus, the Fourth District's alarmist assertion on
appeal - that if it lacked tile "authority to demand this level of accountability from agents who
transact business on bail bonds . . . unscrupulous bail agents could easily run amok, writing one

bad bond aftef anotl~er"- has 110basis in fact. Appellant's Brief, pg. 27. Moreover, a bail agent
who is running "amok" would be subject to action by the DOI, up to and including license
revocation. See I.C. 3 41-1016.
The district court correctly determined that imposing substantive obligations on
individual bail agents is beyond the ADJ's authority over the operation of the district courts and
invades the province of the legislature to enact substantive laws. Therefore, this Court should
affirm the above portions of the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction
h.

The district court's decision does not limit the ADJ's Lawful authority
over the operation of the district courts.

In this appeal, the Fourth District argues "the District Court's holding that [the
Guidelines] may not regulate individual bail agents is based on the incorrect assumption that the
agency relationship between a bail agent and the agent's surety tr~impsboth the ADJ's authority
o v e r matters pertaining to bail and judges.' ability to oversee their courtrooms." Appellant's
Brief, p. 7. The Fourth .District errs. The district court's ruling was consistent with statutes and
rules pertaining 1.0 bail bonds and in no way conflicts with the legitimate scope of the ADJ's
authority over matters of bail
Once the discretionary determinatioil has been made to permit a criminal defendant to
secure release from custody by posting bail, both statute and court rule provide that he may do so

by posting any one of the three "sufficient sureties" under Idaho law, including a bail bond. I.C.
$ 19-2907(1); I.C.R. 46(f)(l). A duly qualified surety is authorized to be the sole surety on a bail

bond. I.C. 3 41-2604.
The Fourth District aclznowledges that it is not a party to the bail bond contract. Tr. p. 59,

In. 11-14. Instead, through the Guidelines, the ADJ created a second bail bond contract - one
between the court and individual bail agents in their personal capacity. R. (Vol. II) pg. 325
(Fourth District Reply Re Motion to Reconsider) ("There are two contracts governing bail and
bail agents in the Fourth Judicial District. 'The first is the bail bond . . .The second is the contract
formed when a bail agent signs and agrees to the terms o f ' the Guidelines); see also App. Exh.
32, pg. 9 ("By signing the Guidelines' contract with the Fourth ~udicialDistrict [the individual
bail agent] inaltes himself or herself responsible to ensure the payment of forfeited bonds"; Tr. p.
form a contract that bind these individual bail agents"); R. (Vol
11, In. 22-24 ("the g~~idelines

III)(Tr. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 8-24-07) pg. 588, p. 34, In. 8-12 (Fourth District's
counsel arg~ied"a bail agent has many hats. And I believe one of the hats is not only as a bail
agent, but also assumes the duty of partial surety"). The Guidelines requireJ'individual bail
agents" to perform a "historic" role that exisied before "corporate sureties" - a role in which the
bail agent was "personally responsible." Tr. p. 41: In. 11-19. As deter~~lined
by the district court,
the "ADJ does not have the authoi-ity to lawf~~lly
make the bail agent responsible for payment of
forfeited bonds" and a contract imposing siich responsibility "is beyond the.ADJ's authority and .

. . is unlawful and unenforceable." R. (Vol. III) pg. 483.
In the Fourth District's summary judgment motion, it conceded that the Guidelines are
substantive in nature. App. Exh. 32 pg. 10. It is not the Fourth District's role to create additional
substantive requirements for bail agents because it believes existing law is inadequate,
particularly where Idaho statute and criminal rules indicate that a corporate surety is authorized
to become the sole surety on a bail bond. See Permit No. 36-7200 v. Higgiizsoiz, 121 Idaho 819,
824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992) (the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of statutes are

questions for the Legislature alone). Both the legislature and Supreme Court have provlded that

a bail bond posted by a surety authorized to do business in Idaho is a "swfficient surety." See 1.C
§ 19-2907(1); I.C.R. 46(f)(l). The ADS laclts the authority to require bail agents, in their

individual capacities, to become a second surety on the bail bond.

c.

the Fourth District's conclusory contention that the Guidelines do not
make individual bail agents "sureties" is ul~supportedby the record.

As it did below in the district court, the Fourth District insists that the Guidelines do not
make individual bail agents co-sureties. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 25-26. Inso contending, the
Fourtli District asserts that the Guidelines do not impose "financial responsibility" on bail agents
but, rather, the "ADJ mak[es] individual agents 'morally' responsible for the payment of
forfeited bonds, i.e. for facilitating payment on bonds." App. Exh. 32, pg. 9; see also App. Exh
19 (Williamson Affidavit 7-10-08). The ADJ's conclusory allegation that the "Guidelines are
not intended to make individual bail agents co-suretiesn8ignores the plain language in the
Guidelines that the bail agent is responsible to "ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid" and
their practical effect. The Fourth Distsict argiied below that, it must have some method of
collecting money in the event a forfeiture is not paid and "rather than deal with a faceless entity"
For the first time on appeal, the Fourth District contends that the ADS'S interpretation
that the Guidelines are not intended to make individual bail agents co-sureties is entitled to the
same deference as an executive agency's interpretation of a statute. Appellant's Brief pg. 26, n.5.
Issues not raised below may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Leader v. Reirzer, 143
Idaho 635,637, 151 P.3d 831, 833 (2007). Moreover, the deference given an executive agency's
interpretation of a statute relates to respect for the authority of a co-branch o f government. See
J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'iz, 120 Idaho 849,853-54,820 P.2d 1206, 1210-11
(1991). The judiciary freely reviews courts' legal interpretations and this Court should not defer
to the ADS'S interpretation of the Guidelines she created. Even if local judicial guidelines were
entitled to deference, dderence would not be warranted because the conclusion that the
Guidelines do not make individual bail agents co-sureties is ~111reasonable.

the Fourth District "turn[s], quite expectedly to the entity's agent, or in Two Jinn's case, the
courts turn to individual agents." See R. (Vol. 111) pg. 477-78. The district court correctly noted
that the Fourth District's insistencethat individual bail agents are not co-sureties was belied by
this argument. Id. As found by the district court "it seems clear that the purpose of holding the
'individual bail agent' accountable for the non-payment of forfeited bonds is to enforce the
payment of the bond by holding the hvel~hoodof the lowest level of the food chain (ball agent)
hostage to the actions or non-actions of the person or entities liable on the bail bond." R. (Vol.

Whethev coined a "financial" or "moral" responsibility, an individual bail agent has the
choice of paying the bond himself or being put out of work when a surety has not timely paid a
forfeiture. The Guidelines thus have the effect of malcing individual bail agents co-sureties on
the bonds they post.

d.

conclusion,

The personal sesponsibility placed on individual bail agents is not provided for by law
and is substantive in nature. Thus, the Guidelines imposing that responsibility fall outside the
judiciary's procedural rule-making authority. Such Guidelines also infringe on the legislature's
inherent authority to enact substantive laws, including laws governing surety insurance
companies and providing that such companies are authorized to be the sole surety on bail bonds.
Moreover, this imposition of individual responsibility conflicts with court rules recognizing that
a corporate surety is authorized to become the sole surety on a bail bond. Accordingly, not only
does the imposition of individual responsibility fall outside the judiciary's authority over matters
of procedure, it falls outside the ADJ's authority pursuant to I.C. 5 1-907. This Court should

therefore affinn the declaratory judgment and permanent lnlunctlon

4.

The Guidelines' extensive regulation of bail agents is unlawful pursuant to
I.C. $5 1-907,l-213 and the Idaho Constitution

Public policy considerations are primarily the business of the Legislature. Ruffling v. Ada
Counl): Paramedics, 145 Idaho 943,946, 188 P.3d 885, 888 (2008). It 1s tlius within the
prerogative of the legislature to create and regulate substantive rights. See Currington, 108 Idaho
at 540,700 P.2d at 943. "Just as Article II of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the Legislature
from usurping powers properly belonging to the judicial department, so does that provision
prohibit the judiciary from improperly invading the province of the Legislature." In re SRBA
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255 912 P.2d at 623. Accordingly, rules of the court must not
abridge, enlarge nor modify substantive rights. See I.C.

1-213; Currington, 108 Idaho at 540,

700 P.2d at 943.
Regulation of the character a i d fitness of bail agents for the protection of the public is-a
lawf1.11exercise of the legislature's inherent pol~cepower. In pronlulgating Guidelines that
pillport to also regiilate tile character and fitness of bail agents, the Fourth District invaded an
area properly beloug~ngto the legislatul-e. Additionally, statutes and rules setting forth the
requirements and qualifications of surety companies and bail agents create a substantive interest
in having satisfaction of those requirements and qualifications considered prima facie evidence
that the surety and bail agent are authorized to post bonds. The Guidelines' pre-approval process
interest. The regulation of bail agents provided for
for individual agents abridges that s~~bstantive
in the Guidelines also lacks a nexus to the supervision and authority over the operation of the
courts and conflicts with the Idaho Criminal Rules. Accordingly, even if it is within the

judiciary's inherent authority to regulate bail agents in the manner set forth in the Guidelines,
those Guidelines fall outside the scope of the ADJ's authority pursuant to I.C. $ 1-907.

a.

the district court correctly determined that the character and fitness
evaluation is not procedural.

In order to secure placement on the authorized []st,ball agents must submit to a character
and fitness evaluation, which includes a criminal background check and an obligatio'n to disclose
juvenile charges -even those that were dismissed. R. (Vol. E) pg. 351, 357-67,377-383, App.
Exh. 25 (McKay Affidavit 8-21-2008), Exh. A (Transcript, In Re Shai?tnvn Cnrlock 1-9-08), pp.
4-6. The Administrative Order prolnulgating the Guidelines provides that "it is in the best
interest of the general public and the court to ensure that pelsons or entlties who are permitted to
present for acceptance of bail bonds . . . possess qualiFications of good character and conduct
their business in an ethical, prompt and law-abiding manner." R. (Vol. 1'1)pg. 342. In this
appeal, the Fourth District urges that this cliaracter and fitness evaluation is necessary because "a
bail agent's character is extremely important to the work slhe performs in the court system."
Appellant's Brief, p. 9; see cilso App. Exh. 14 (Williailison Affic1:rvil 8-14-07) I[14 ("the
character of the bailibond agent is a critical factor for the coui?s in releasing an accused into his
or her care").
"Procedural" rules are those which pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the
courts, by which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated. Curvi~zgtoiz,108 Idaho at
541, 700 P.2d at 944. Protecting the public by deciding which bail agents are of good moral
character does not relate to the mechanical operations of the court. As noted by the district court,
the Fourth District:

'fail[s] to even suggest why . . . a surety bond posted by a corporation
specifically authorized by law to be the sole surety on a bail bond, requires that
the agent of the col-porate surety be of good moral character, as determined by the
ADS, but that there is no good character determination for the criminal defendant
o r other individuals posting a cash bond.
While the rationales tendered by the ADS inight be aspirational for any
poster of bail, whether private surety," cash or surety bond, there is nothing in the
record, the guidelines, or the statutory and case law that requires a bail agent "to
assure the accused's appearance, and ***the duty to monitor and supervise the
accused after release on bail and to recapture should he or she fail to appear."
Absent some special agreement, the only obligation o f . . . corporate sureties is to
pay into court the amount of the bail. For circumstances involving cash bail, there
is no obligation, just the loss of the monies posted.

R. (Vol. III) pg. 469-70 (footnotes omitted). The good character of bail agents has no direct
relationship to the surety's ability to pay its obligation under the bail bond. Ensuring bail agents'
good character is not part of the mechanical operations of the district court.
Corporate sureties have ample financial motivation to utilize agents who make
'responsible decisions with respect to posting bonds and to take active and effective steps to recapture absconders. Aladdin's sureties have contracted with Aladdin to recaptiire fugitives and
seek relief FI-omforfeiture. App. Exh. 37 (Botz Affidavit) 1[4. However, individual bail agent
employees do not have an obligation to monitor and supervise the accused and theii-character
and fitness is unrelated to the administration and operation of the district courts.
The Fourth District seeks to make much of a statement on Aladdin's website indicating it
will assist defendants with the court process. See Appellant's Brief, p. 9, n.2. Assisting a

The district couli issued its decision prior to the enactment of the Idaho Bail Act, which
became effective on July 1,2009. Under the old law, two "sufficient sureties" could execute and
acknowledge before the court the undeilaking of sufficient bail. See I.C. $5 2909, 19-2910
(2007); see ~zlsoR. (Vol. III), 468-69. Provisio~isrelated to "private sureties" were adopted by
the tenitorial legislature and "did not address bail bonds because bail bonds did not exist when
they were enacted." Leader,'143 Idaho at 639-40, 151 P.3d at 835-36.

criminal defendant with' the court process is a far cry from monitoring and supefvising that
person following his release. Further, Aladdin's financial incentive to assist criminal defendants
in understanding the court process should not be confused with a legal or contractual obligations
to the Fourth Distr~ct.The obligat~onunder the bail bond agreement is for the surety to pay the
amount of a forfe~lilre,an agreement to wh~chnelther the Fourth Dtstnct, Aladd~nnor its
employees are a party Further, as noted by the d ~ s t r ~court,
ct
although Aladdln's webslte "mlght
raise a question concerning its obligation to defendants . . . the Guidelines do not examine
[Aladdin's] qualifications." R. (Vol. 111) pg. 470, 17.3 (emphasis added). Aladdin, not its
individual bail agents, advertises that it will assist defendants in understanding the court process.
The district court held that those Guidelines that condition placement on the authorized
list on submitting to a character and fitness evaluation "create an additional substantive license
procedure which more than dulslicates the licensure procedure provided by the DOI." R. (Vol

TI.].) pg. 470. The district coiirt thus enjoined enforcement of the sections of the Guidelines that
permit the TCA to refiise to place a bail agent on the authorized list where that agent is not
employed in a state, county or cou1-t related position; not related by blood to a Fourth Judicial
District Judge; has disclosed required information on the application form; is licensed by the
DOI; and is authorized to post bonds for a DO1 certified insurance company. The district court
Euuther elljoined the Foulth District kom seeking removal of a bail agent from the authorized list
for a basis that would be a basis for suspension, revocation or refusal of the DO1 bail agent
license. R. (Vol. ID)pg. 492-95. Because the district court's decision to enjoin those sections
was col-sect, this Court should affirm the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction.

b.

Bail agents and the court do not do business together.

Despite acknowledging that neither the court nor the individual bail agent is a party to the
bail bond agreement, the Fourth District continually asserts it must have the authority to regulate
bail agents with whom it "does business" or "t~ansacts"business. See Appellant's Brief pg. 5-6,

17. Absent from these assertions is a description of how, exactly, the court and bail agents do
"business" together. The court, in an exercise ol' its inherent authority, determines whether a
criminal defendant should be allowed to post bail and, if so, what amount of bail should be
required. Bail agents do not participate in the process of fixing bail and do not "operate in
cou~-trooms."
As ti result of Aladdin's contract with its sureties, Aladdin is a real party in interest on the
bail bonds it sells and, at various times, pursues relief from forfeiture as a litigant. See R. (Vol.

111) pg. 455. In so doing, Aladdin is not transacting business with the court, which is not a party
to the bail bond contract and, instead, is a party to an action before the court. By hearing
Aladdin's motions for relief from forfeiture, the Fourth District is not doing business with
Aladdin but instead acting as an impartial court.
According to the Fourth District "individual bail agents are involved in posting bail,
forfeiture of bail, and exoneration of bail" while Aladdin contends that "individual bail agents
have a different role vis-a-vis ihe courts in transacting bail bond business: none whatsoever."
Appellant's Brief, pg. 9, n.2. Individual Aladdin bail agents have a role in the bail bond process
and Aladdin has not contended otherwise. Bail agents communicate with a criminal defendant
and his family and evaluate whether posting a particular bail bond would be a sound business
decision on behalf of Aladdin and its sureties. As admitted by the Fourth District below, the

Fourth District is not a party to the bail bond agreement between the defendant, the surety and the
state. The court determines whether a particular defendant is a sound candidate for bail and, if
so, what amount should be requlred and what cond~t~ons
should be imposed. The court docs not
determine how that bond should be posted - as cash, property or bail bond - and does not
transact bail bond business. The only direct relationship between individual bail agents and the
Fourth District is that unlawfully imposed by the Guidelines.
c.

tlle ADJ lacks the authority to regulate bail agents for the protection
of the public.

In the administrative order promulgating the Guidelines, the ADJ acknowledged that the
Guidelines seek to ensure that bail agents are of good characler and conduct ethical business for
the best interest of the general public and the court. See R. (Vol. 11) pg. 342. It is well-settled,
however, it is within the province of the state legislature, under the broad concept of police
power, to enact laws conce~-inngthe health, safety and welfare of the people. State v. Ibller, 122
Idaho 409,410, 835 P.2d 644,645 (1992). The legislature's police power includes the authority
to regulate the right to pursue an occupation Tor the protection of the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. See Jones

11.

State Bd of Mediciize, 97 Idaho 859, 868, 555 P.2d 399,408

(1976). The Idaho legislature exercised this authority by enacting various laws restricting the
rights of persons to pursue careers in the retail bail bond business and defining qualifications and
requirements to maintain a license to work as a bail bond agent or surety company. See I.C. SS
42-201,42-211, and 41-1.037 to 1045. A fundamental concept of Amesican government is that
the judiciary is bound to respect the legislature's reasonable exercise of its inherent authority and
cannot interfere with it in the absence of a constitutional offense. Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy,

'

On appeal, the Fourth Dlstrsct contends that the Gu~dellnes'regulatson of ball agents 1s
lawCu1 because two branches of government can co-regulate d~fferentaspects of one area wlthout
violating the Constitution. Appellant's Brief pg. 22. However, both the statutory framework for
licensing bail agents and the Guidelines' regulation of bail agents purport to ensure that those
agents are ethical and law abiding for the protection of the public. The Fourth District and the
DO1 are not co-regulating different aspects of the same area but, rather, the Fourth District reevaluates the same criteria considered by the DO1 as a result of its apparent belief that the DO1
regulation is insufficient.
Additionally, in contending that the Guidelines do not invade the province of the
legislature, the Fourth District asserts "the licensing f~~nction
(authorizing a person to hold
himself out as qualified to perform the licensed service) is distinct froin t'he decision whether to
use the licensee's services." Icl. at pg. 23. Thus, according to the Fourth District, "the DO1
statutes for bail agents are analogous to those for health insurers; the Foulth District's
[Guidelines] are analogous to the . . . requirements to bid upon the contract to provide health
insurance for State employees." Id. at pg. 24. The Fourth District's reasoning ignores that the
purchaser of the bail agents' services is not the court, but the criminal defendant. As discussed
above, the individual bail agents and the court do not do business together. The Guidelines do
not determine which bail agents the court elects to purchase a service from but, instead, regulates
which bail agents can hold themselves out as qualified to sell bail bonds to criminal defendants
within the Fousth District. Determining the character and fitness of bail agents on a broad basis
for the protection of the p~rblicis a legislative, not judicial function.

'

Moreover, the Fourth District's alarmist proclamation that "as a consequence of the

District Coult's holding, the Fourth District must . . . transact bail bond business with convicted
felons" [Appellant's Brief, p. 51 is simply untrue. Initially, a felony conviction, along with other
misconduct, is a basis for the DO1 to suspend, refuse to issue or revoke a bail agent's producer
license. A bail agent without a producer license loses his or her ability to post bonds in any
judicial district. Further, neither the Fourth District nor the bail agent is a party to the bail bond
contract. As discussed above, the Fourth District and individual bail agents do not "transact bail
bond business" together.
The Fourth District appears to question the DOI's ability to adequately protect the public
through its licensing of bail agents and broadly asserts "a bail agent's character is extremely
important to the worlc slhe performs in the court system." Appellant's Brief, pg. 9. Citing to
Applicntioiz oj'Kn~(fi~~ait,
69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949), a case concerning the judiciary's
inherent authority to admit attorneys to the bar, the Fourth District asks this Court to conclude
"the trial courts may exercise their inherent authority to decide which bail agents they will allow
to write bail in their courtrooms." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12.
ILicensing of attorneys is distinguishable from the Guidelines' regulation of bail agents
given that attomeys, not bail agents, are officers of the coilst. Because an attorney is an officer of
the court, he or she "is brought into close and intimate relations with the coult." Kaufnmrz, 69
Idaho at 310, 206 P.2d at 535. And, while bail agents undoubtedly provide an important service
to the public and the quality of their work has an effect on the criminal justice system, it cannot
be seriously contended that bail agents, particularly salaried employees such as Ms. Carloclc,
have an intimate relationship with the court in the same manner. as attomeys. Further, other

profess~onsalso perform "extremely important" work in the criminal lustxce court system - 1.e
police officers, probation officers, evidence custodians, lab technicians, jail staff, and substance
abuse evaluators That a profession Impacts public safety p e m t s the leg~slatureto regulate the
right to practice that professton pursuant to its pollce power. See Jones, 97 Idaho at 868, 555
P.2d at 408 Thc judiclaiy's inherent authority over procedure does not author~zeit to regulate
every profession that impacts the crimlnal justlce system.
The Fourlh District is not entitled to define and modify the right to occupational liberty in
order to protect the public. If the Fourth District is concerned that those statutes regulating
sureties and bail agents are insufficient to provide adequate protection, its remedy is with the
legislature.
(1.

a bail bond license issued by the DO1 and an appointment by a
certified surety are prima facie evidence of qualification to execute
hail bonds.

The statutes and court rules regulating bail agents and surety companies create a
substantive interest in having documentation of an active DO1 license and appointment by a d~ily
qualified surety considered sufficient evidence that the bail agent is qualified to execute bail
bonds on behalf of its insurer. Thepre-approval process created by the Guidelines, which
requires an extensive background check, violates statute and separation oT powers by abrogating
and conditioning those substantive interests
Surety companies ineetlng DO1 requirements are authorized to become the sole surety on
bail bonds and all courts and judges "shall accept and treat such bond" as "fully and completely
complying" with the requirements of law. I.C. 5 41-2604; see also I.C. 5 41-2603(2) (DO1
certificate "shall be received in evidence as a sufficient justification of such surety and its

authority to do business in this state"); ICR 46(f) ("bail may be posted in the form o f . . . a bail
bond issued by a surety insurance company qualified by law to do business in the state of Idaho);
ICMX 13(c)(3) ("a fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or trust company authorized to do business in
the state of Idaho and authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on undertakings and
bonds may execute the written undertakings provided for in these rules, which may be accepted
by the person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge unless otherwise ordered by
the administrative judge of the judicial distuict").
Corporate sureties submit to an extensive examination of their assets and liabilities and
are required to post deposits for the "protection of all its policyho1ders and creditors." I.C.

5

41-316A; see also J.C. $5 41-308, 319, 326, 335. The DO1 examines the affairs, transactions,
accounts, records, and assets of each authorized surety as often as the DO1 deems advisable and
not less frequently than once every five years in order to determine its financial condition, ability
to fulfill and mannel. of f~~lfillment
of its obligations, the nature of its operations, and compliance
with the law. I.C. $ 41-219(1). Bail agents s ~ ~ b mtoi ta character and fitness evaluation, which
includes a criminal history check, prior to being licensed. I.C. 5 41-1007. Bail agents face
penalties and revocation of their license for failure to comply with licensing statutes, including
t h e failure to report that any criminal charges have been filed against the agent, or for engaging in
misconduct relative to their profession. I.C. $5 41-1016,41-1021. Bail agents also must post a
$15,000 bond "to be held in trust for the benefit and protection of the public against a judicial or
administrative determination of loss by acts ol fraud or dishonesty by the bail agent." I.C. §
41-1040.
The regulation provided in the above statutes creates a substantive interest in having

compliance with that regulation be considered sufficient in the absence of specific reasons: See
LC.

$3 41-2603(2), 41-2604; I.C.R. 46(f); I.C.M.R. 13'(c)(3);see also American Druggist Ins.

Co. v. Bogart, 707 F.2d 1229, 1235 (1 1"' Cir. 1983) (disqualification list impacted protected
interest of sureties to hold themselves out as sureties and be eligible for employment in the
district); Berry v. Sumnzers, 76 Idaho 446, 451, 283 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1955) (right to follow a
recognized and useful occupation is a right protected by the constitution); In re Irzt'l Fid.Ins.
Co., 989 S.W.2d 726,729 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (insurance statutes requii-ing deposits creates
substantive right in having those deposits be considered sufficient in the absence of a finding of
speclfic reasons by local judges)
Evldence that a ball agent has an actlve DO1 hcense and is appomted by a duly qual~f~ed
surety is sufficient evidence that the bail agent is qualified to execute bail bonds on behalE of its
surety. Those Guidelines, particularly Section 11 O. (Vol 11) pg. 357-59 ) and the application for
placement on the authorized list O. (Vol 11) pg. 377-383) interfere with the substantive interests
created by the statutes by requiring an extensive pre-approval process. Accordingly, those
Guidelines are an unlawful exercise of the judiciary's procedural rule-making authority 01. the
ADJ's authority under I.C. S 1-907

e.

Neither the cases nor the court rules relied on by the Fourth District
support the extensive regulation of bail agents provided for in the
Guidelines.

In this allpeal, as it did below, the Fourth District cla~ms"no less authority than the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that it is the courts, and not bondsmen, who should be in control
of the worhngs of the bail system." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. The Fourth District then cites
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), which upheld legislatiorz abolishing commercial bail. See

Appellant's Brief, p. 12; Schilb, 404 U.S. af 360. The Bail Plaintiffs have not argued that
"bondsman" should control the bail system as asserted by the Fourth District but, rather, that the
legislature was entitled to authorize surety insurance companies to become the sole surety on bail
bonds and that the legislature is entitled to regulate bail agents for the protection of the public.
Idaho, as a matter of public policy, has authorized surety companies to become,the sole surety on
the bail bonds. As the district court found:
Idaho as a matter of public policy has determined that compensated bail bond
sureties are limited to corporations authorized to conduct a surety business. I.C. $5
41-103,41-305,41-308,4-1-507, and 41-2604. It is the ADJ's use of the
Guidelines to place the obligations of a surety on bail agents that runs afoul of the
separation of powers doctrine.
R. (Vol. 111) pg. 475.
Interestingly, the Fourth District also cites favorably lo a second case involving legislative
abolishment of commercial bail, Steplzerzs v. Boizding Assiz ofKentucky, 538 S.W.2d 580 (Ky.
1976). In Stephens, the court reasoned that "the policy to be foilowed in promoting the public
welfare is a legislative matter. If the interest of the public is affected, the adjustment is a matter
for the legislature. That problem calls into play the 'police power.' The power is as broad and
comprehensive as the demands of society make necessary." Id. at 583. Unlike the vast majority

oF states which permit commercial bail, the Kentucky legislative body opined that "the business
of commercial bail bonding [was] detrimental to the welfare of the citizens of the
Commonwealth [and] responded accordingly." As a matter of public policy, the Idaho legislature
has not only declined to abolish commercial bail, it specifically recognized a bail bond as a
"sufficient surety" for the purposes of posting bail under the new Idaho Bail Act. See I.C.

5 19-

2907. That an autholized corporate surety is a "sufficient': surety is further recognized in I.C.R.

'

46(f).
~ d d i t i o n a lI.C.M.R.
l~
13(c)(3), like the cases relied on by the ~ o u r t hDistrict, support the
idea that a surety could be removed for misconduct but not that the courts can require bail agents
to be personally responsible for bonds and to submit to apre-approval character and fitness
evaluation. See also In re Johnson, 217 S.E.2d 85, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) ("bondsman"
knowingly filed reports that failed to accurately "show the bonds upon which he had persoizally
becorne obligated") (emphasis added). Pursuant to Rule 13(c)(3), a bond issued by a company
authorized to be the sole surety may be accepted by the person receiving the bond on a
misdemeanor without prior approval by a judge unless otherwise ordered by the administrative
judge of the judicial district.
As discussed above, the rule reflects a presumption that a qualified surety may post the
bond unless the ADS has grounds to order otherwise. Thus, this rule supliorts the district court's
conclusion that the ADS may prevent further bonds from being posted on behalf of a defaulting
surety. However, Rule 13(c)(3) fails to support an extensivepre-approval process, in which bail
agents who are duly licensed and have not engaged in any misconduct must disclose "everything"
in their history, including dismissed juvenile charges [App. Exh. 25 (McKay Affidavit 8-21-08),
Exh. A (Tr. CarlocWGalindo Hearing 1-9-08), p. 7, in. 19-21] so that the ADJ can sc.rutinize their
character and fitness.
Citing Leader, the Fourth District claims that Idaho couit rules reflect the understanding
that "it was up to the courts to determine the sufficiency of sureties." Appellant's Brief, p. 14.
However, the pertinent portion of Leader notes that the bail statutes in efsect a t the time required
courts to determine the sufficiency of sureties. Leader, 143 Idaho at 639-40, 151 P.3d at 82-83.

As the Supreme Court noted, "mod~fyingthe statutes to make them applicable to bail bond
agents and surety companies is the province of the legislature." Id at 640, 151 P.3d at 83 S~nce
the Leader decis~on,the Idaho legislature has so acted on two occasions. F~rsl,effect~veJuly 1,
2007, the legislature clanfied that the surety was the entity ent~tledto notice of forfe~tureby
amending the former I.C. 5 19-2927 to require that notice of forfeiture be sent to the surety's
designated agent. Second, effective July 1, 2009, the legislature enacted the Idaho Bail Act
which revoked prior bail laws in their entirety. 2009 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 90, 5 2. The new
laws no longer include the provision referenced by the Fourth District in its appellant's brief that
required coin-ts to determine the sufficiency of "private sureties." Compare I.C. $5 2909, 192910 (2007) witlz I.C.

19-2905(3), 19-2907. Even if the former I.C. 5 19-2909 entitled the

Fourth District to regulate individual bail agents, it no longer exists
The Fourth District also cites to the former Rule 46, which indicated bail could he posted
by depos~tinga "cashier's check, money order or a personal check . . . under such procedures as
shall be established by the ADJ." Appellant's Brief, p. 14. Initially, the quoted portion of the
rule pertained to private sureties, as distinguished from coiporate sureties, and cash bonds.
Moreover, the cuiscnt Rule 46 provides:

(0Bail, form, conditions andplace of deposit. ( I ) Bail may be posted in the form
of cash deposit, property bond, or a bail bond issued by a surety insurance
company qualified by law to do business in the state of Idaho. The surety shall
clearly identify on the bond the name and mailing address of the person
designated to receive all notices. The coult shall not require that bail be posted
only in cash, nor shall the court specify difFering amounts for bail depending upon
whether it is posted in the form of cash deposit, a property bond, or a bail bond. A
cash deposit shall consist of payment in the form of United States currency,
money order, certified check or cashier's check. Cash deposit may also be made by
personal check payable to the clerk of the court where the acceptance of the
personal check has been approved by a magistrate judge or district judge, or by

credit card or debit card in those counties where procedures for the acceptance of
such payment have been approved by the admi~iistrativedistrict judge.
Thus, the ADJ has the authority to approve the payment of cash bonds by credlt or debit card - a
clearly procedural function. These rules in no way authorize the ADJ to impose additional
responsibilities on individual bail agents and to require those agents to submit to an extensive
pre-approval process that includes a character and fitness evaluation.
District cites to Culvert 1). Lupeer Circuit Judges, 502 N.W.2d 293 (Mich.
Tlie FOUIT~
1993), a split decision from the Michigan Supreme Court. This case does not support the
extensive bail agent regulation provided for in the Guidelines. In Michigan, judges are required
by statute to maintain a list of persons engaged in the business of providing bail bonds in

.

criminal cases. Mich. Comp. Laws $ 750.167b(4). In Cnlvert, sevei-a1judges removed a bail
agent's name from this list after finding that he violated the penal code relating to bail bonds
The agent appealed and the Michigan Coui;t of Appeals stayed the agent's removal from the list,
finding that the power to determine moral fitness or fiscal responsibility rested with the Insurance
Commissiones, instead of the courts. Cnlijert, 502 N.W.2d at 293; Crili~ertv. Lcipeer Circuit
Judges, 468 N.W.2d 253,254 (Mich. App. 1991). In a 5-idecision, the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed, Finding that the inherent disc]-etionof judges to determine whether bond is
sufficient to ensure the presence of the defendant extended to the ability to remove names from
the list of agents. Culvert, 502 N.W.2d at 294
Several factors distinguish the Guidelines and Idaho law from the circumstance in
Culvert. Initially, the "bondsman" in Culvert was removed for violating the penal code
concerning the writing of bonds. The Guidelines in this case do not allow bail agents to post

bonds within the Fo~zrthDistrict until they have submitted an application with a detailed
recitation of their background and a criminal history check. Ms. Carlock's application for
placement on tile authorized list was denied because she did not understand the question on the
application concerning felony charges to include juvenile matters. The ADJ questioned Mr.
Davis's integrity because he had received a misdemeanor withheld judgment seven years earlier
and only placed him on the authorized list after creating a "probationary period in which he
would be subject to removal after only two violations of the Guidelines. This extensive preapproval process goes well beyond prohibiting bail agents who have engaged in misconduct in
the course of their business from posting bonds. As found by the district court "Calvevt does not
address the question of judicial power to license or determine the character or fitness of a bail
agent." R. (Val. IU)pg. 473.
Calvert is also wrongly decided. As noted by the dissent, the Cnlvert majority mistalcenly
equated the exercise of judicial discretion to determine bond in an individuill case with the
administrative task of compiling a list of agents and to determine the fitness of agents on a broad
basis. See Cnlvert, 502 N.W.2d at 297-99 (dissent). 111reaching its conclusion, the Calvevt
majority cited to Tennessee cases, which involve a statutory system distinct from that in Idaho or
Michigan. See Tenn. CODE ANN.

$3 40-11-302(a) & (b) (Unlike Idaho, the Tennessee

legislature excepted "professional bondsmen" in criminal cases from the laws governing
insurance companies and, instead, granted courts the authority to regulate the bondsmen); see
also R. (Vol. m)pg. 474 ("applicatio~lof Tennessee cases . . . is of little help. Tennessee,
contrary to Idaho, by statute males such bail agents sureties on the bail bonds they issue").
The case law and rules cited by the Fourth District in fact support the proposition that the

courts can prevent a surety from continuing to post bonds if it engages in misconduct or refuses
to pay owing bonds These cases fail to support the extenswe, pre-approval process of ball
agents set foith in the Gn~delinesand havlng those bail agents become co-suretles

f.

conclusion.

Bail agents must submit to a character and fitness evaluation, iilcluding periodic renewal
applications, prior to being able to post bonds in the Fourth Judicial Dist~ict. This process
infringes on the legislature's police power to enact laws regulating professions for the protection
of the public. The Guidelines' regulation of bail agents also unlawfully regulates and abridges
the substantive rights to occupational liberty and to have a licer~seissued by the DO1 and an
appointment by a certified surety considered presumptively sufficient qualification to execute
bail bonds. Moreover, because those Guidelines do not set forth the mechanical operations by
which bail and the bail bond contract are effectuated, they fall outside the judiciary's procedural
rule-making authority. Finally, even i f the Guidelines' bail agent regulation could be an
appropriate exercise of this Court's authol-ity, the Guidelines exceed the scope of the ADJ's
a~rthorityover the operation of the courts and conflict with the criminal rules. Accordingly, the
district court correctly enjoined enforcement of Sections 11 and 14 and the Application to
Become an Authorized Bail Agent as set forth in the declaratory judgment and permanent
injunction.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Bail Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court affirm
the district court's declaratory judgment and permanent injunction.
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A.

11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a cross-appeal by the PlaintifflCross-Appellants -Two Jinn, Inc., doing business

as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds (hereinafter "Aladdin") and two bail agents
employed by Aladdin, James Garske and Shantara Carlock (collectively "Bail Plaintiffs") - from
the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction issued by the district court following its
decision on cross motions for summary judgment, which enjoins enforcement of certain sectio~~s
of the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter "Guidelines").

B.

Statement of Facts
Aladdin, Mr. Garske andMs. Carlock are licensed bail agents. R. Vol. Il pg 276-77, 2,

6-8lAppellate Exhibit ("App. Exh.") 32, pg. 5;' App. Exh.45 (Garslte Affidavit 10-1-08) q[ 4,
Exh. A. Bail agents are licensed to solicit and transact bail with the general public on behalf of a
surety insurer which appoints them to execute its bail bonds. See LC. S; 41-1038(1). To secure
their licences through the Idaho Department of Insurance (hereinafter "DOT'), bail agents are
required to undergo a criminal history check; a character and fitness evaluation, and to maintain a
surety performance bond of $15,000 for the bendit and protection of the public against acts of
fraud or dishonesty. R. Vol. 11 pg 278-79, ql 18-19,251App.Exh. 32, pg. 5; see also I.C. SS

41-1006-07,41-1016,41-1039,41-1040.
Aladdin is an independent contractor for two surety companies who have authorized it to

' For purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue in this appeal, the Fourth
District conceded a number of facts alleged in the Bail Agents amended complaint.
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, App. Exh. 32, pg. 5. In this brief, those facts
will be referenced by a joint citation to the Amended Complaint 8.Vol. I1 pg. 275- 294) and
page five of the Defendants' summary judgment memorandum (App. Exh. 32).

execute and deliver bail bonds to secure the release of criminal defendants. App. Exh. 37 (Peter
~ b t Affidavit)
z
Exh. A-1 & B-I. Through the efforts of its individual bail agent employees such

as Ms. Cailock, Aladdin binds one of its suretles lo pay the amount of the posted bond in the
event the criminal defendant fails to appear as ordered. Id.
The Guidelines require all individual bail agents such as Mr. Garske and Ms. Carlock to
apply for placement on an authorized list of bail agents maintained by the TCA (herejnafter
"authorized list"). R. (Val. JI) pg. 350. The Guidelines require each bail bond business such as
Aladdin to list one "supervising agent" who must assume responsibility for all bonds executed by
bail agents in the business's employ. Id. at pg. 347. Mr. Garske is Aladdin's supervising agent,

R. (Vol. m.)
pg. 452. The Guidelines make no attempt to approve sureties or bail bond
businesses and, instead, their scope is strictly limited to the regulation of individual bail agents
and supervising bail agents. R. (Vol. JII) pg. 465.
As part of the application for placement on the authorized list, individual bail agents must
undergo another character and fitness evaluatioll like that conducted by the DOI. R. (Vol. 11) pg.
279-80, 251Exh. 32, pg. 5; R. (Vol. 11) pg. 269. The grounds for refusing to issue, suspending
or revolung a producer license issued by the DO1 are substantially identical to the grounds under
which the TCA can refuse to place a bail agent on the a~ithorizedlist or can petition for an
agent's removal from the authorized list. Con~pareI.C. § 41-1016(1)(f) with R. (Vol. II) pg. 358
(Guidelines § 1l.EI.A) (describing criminal history that is grounds for license discipline or to
disqualify or remove bail agent from authorized list); I.C. $41-1016(l)(f) with R. (Vol. If) pg.
362 (Guidelines 5 1l.EI.A(l) & (2)) (providing for discipline where bail agent pled guilty to any
felony or to a misdemeanor evidencing dishonesty); LC. § 41-1016(l)(h) with R. (Vol. JI)

(Guidelines

5 14.1.A(9))pg. 362 (providing for'bail agent discipline where bail agent has used.

fraudulent or dishonest practices or shown self to be incompetent, untrustwoithy or source of
injury).
Acting pursuant to the Guidelines, the TCA refuses to placc bail agents who arc duly
licensed by the DO1 on the authorized list. R. (Vol. Il) pg. 280, '$ 28lApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. When
the TCA refuses to place a bail agent on the authorized list, that agent must petition the ADJ for
placement on the list, pay a filing fee and wait for a hearing date, which is often several weeks
from the date the petition is filed. R. (Vol. II) pg. 281,9[ 31-321App. Exh. 32, pg. 5; see also
App. Exh. 25 (Scott McKay Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. B & Exh. C. For example, although Ms
Carloclc was duly licensed and had worked for Aladdin as a bail agent in other judicial districts
before moving to the Boise area, the TCAdenied her application for placement on the authoi-ized
list based upon her purported "failure" to disclose on her bail agentapplication a juvenile
proceeding that had been dismissed approximately seven years earlier. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 277, '$7,
pg. 281, 1' [ 32lApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. Ms. Carlock was thereafter required to file a petition, pay a
filing fee and attend a hearing some six weeks later after which she was placed on the authorized
list because the TCA, through the Ada County Prosecutor, withdrew its objection to her
pg.
)7,281,'$ 32IApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5; App. Exh. 25
placement on the authorized list. R. (Vol. !.I
(McKay Affidavit 8-21-08), Exh. A (Tr. Carlock/Galindo Hearing 1-9-08).
Pursuant to Section 14(B) of the Guidelines, the removal of a supervising agent from the
authorized list automatically results in the removal of all bail agents who list that agent as their
supervisor. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 363-64. Because each bail bond business is only permitted, under the
Guidelines, to list one supervising agent, the removal of Mr. Garske from the authorized list

results in the removal of all Aladdin bail agents R. (Vol. U) pg. 285, ql491App. Exh. 32, pg. 5;

R. (Vol. Ii)pg. 347 (Guidelines $ I), 363-64 (Guidelines 5 14).
To maintain placement on the authorized list, a bail agent must undergo another criminal
history check and submit a renewed application before expiration of the bail agent's producer
license. K.(Vol. III) pg. 351 (Guidelines 5 5). The criminal history results must be received
directly from the Idaho State Police ('7SP"). See id. If the TCA believes that a bail agent has not
timely submitted all required license renewal documents (or paid a forfeited bond), then it can
send a "violation notice" informing the bail agent that failure to rectify the alleged violation
within ten days will result in removal from the list. R. (Vol. In) pg. 363-64 (Guidelines

5

14(B)(3)); App. Exh. 8 (Garske Affidavit 7-10-07) Exh. C & Exh 0 . Although an agent can
contest the alleged violation before removal, there is no oppoutunity to contest the TCA's
rejection of an agent's attempt to "rectify" the violation. R. (Vol. TI) pg. 364.
This was illustrated by the 2006 removal of Mr. Garske and thirty-eight other Aladdin
employees. On November 23, 2005, Mr. Garsite renewed his bail agent license and was awaiting
receipt of the official copy of the updated license to renew his placement on the authorized list,
which he believed was necessary to submit that renewal application. App. Exh. 8 (Garske
Affidavit 7-10-07) ![ 13. On January 3,2006, Mr. Garske received a violation notice from the
TCA informing him that his prod~rcerlicense had expired and that if he did not submit "the
required documents for [his] license renewal" in ten days, Mr. Garske and all of his "sub-agents"
would be removed from the authorized list. Id. at Exh. C. The notice further informed Mr.
Garslte that "this is [his] fourth violation notice and that pel- the policy mentioned above, the
[TCA] may request [that the ADJ] remove [his] name from the [authorized list] upon mailing

this notlce." Id.
Upon recelpt of the January 3, 2006 "v!olatlon notlce," Mr Garslte dld everyth~ngunder
his power to comply by submitting his renewal application on January 5, including a receipt that
he had submitted to the ISP criminal history check that day. App. Exh. 8 (Garske Affidavit 711007) fl 13-18; App. Exh. I 1 (Dennis Charney Affidavit 7-16-07), Exh. C (Petition Re Garske),
Exh. 2 (ISP receipt). On January 9, 2006, the ISP sent the criminal history results to the TCA via
statehouse mail. App. Exh. 9 (Judy Charney Affidavit 7-10-07). However, on the aftemoon of
Friday, January 13,2006 - the deadline imposed by the violation notice - the TCA apparently
still had not received the criminal history results from ISP. App. Exh. 26 (Diane Burrell
Affidavit 8-22-08) 'jj 6. Two TCA staff then spent the entire aftemoon removing Mr. Garske and
the 38 Aladdin bail agents who listed him as their supervising agent from the authorized list.
App. Exh. 31 (McKay Affidacit 9-5-08), Exh. F (email between Diane Burrell and Lall.y Reiner),
After 5:00 p.m., the TCA faxed a letter to the jail instructing it not accept bonds from Mr. Garske
and 38 other Aladdin bail agents. App. Exh. 11 (D. Chalney Affidavit 7-10-07) q[ 6, Exh. C
(email and petition), Exh 5 (Notice from TCA to Clerks and Sheriffs 1-13-06).
Because Mr. Garslte and the 38 other Aladdin bail agents were not removed from the
authorized list until after 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before the three-day Martin Luther King
weekend, none of those bail agents could work in the Foulth District for four days. App. Exh. I1
(D. Charney Affidavit 7-10-07) Exh. C; App. Exh. 26 (Burrell Affidavit 8-22-08) 'j[8; App. Exh.
31 (McKay Affidavit 9-5-08) Exh. F (email between Diane Bunell and Larry Reiner). The
removal of Mr. Garske and the 38 Aladdin agents over the holiday weekend - which occurred
solely because Mr. Garske's redundant criminal history check was not received from ISP -

caused Aladdin significant ecoiloinic injury. App. Exh. 45 (Garske Affidavit 10-1-08) fl7, Exh.

Acting pursuant to Section 14, the TCA has threatened to remove or has actually removed

Mi. Garske and other licensed Aiaddin bail agents from the authorized l ~ son
t numerous
occasions. R. (Vol. 11) pg. 285, q[ SlIApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5. Conversely, although some of the
other ~d'aho
judicial districts in which Aladdin conducts its business have implemented bail bond
guidelines, no other judicial district has utilized the guidelines' operatio11to terminale or threaten
to terminate the ability of Aladdin bail agents to post bonds in those districts. R. (Vol. II) pg
287,q 62lApp. Exh. 32, pg. 5.

C.

General Course of Proceedings
The course of the proceedings in the district court is set forth in rhe contemporaneously

filed Respondent's Brief. Respondent's Brief, pg. 8-10, The Bail Plaintiffs hereby incorporate
their statement of the general course of those proceedings herein by reference.

111. ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in concluding that the Fouith District has the authority to

require bail agents to submit to a criminal history check?

2.

Did the district court err in concluding that the Guidelines provide for adequate

procedural protections for purposes of due process following a bail agents' attempt to rectify a
violation identified by the TCA in a violatioi~notice?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standardof

review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion

Boise Tower Associates, LLC v I-logland, 147 Idaho 774,779,215 P.3d 494,499 (2009); P . 0
Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks lianiily Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,237, 159 P.3d 870,874
(2007). summary\udgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 1s no genulne issue as to any materlal fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c)
The facts of this case are largely undisputed and the Bail Plaintiffs agree with the district
court that summary judgment was appropriate. When both parties file motions for summary
judgment relying upon the same facts, issues, and theories, the parties essentially stipulate that
there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the court from entering summary
judgment. Lowder

ii.

Miizidokn Couizty Joint Sclzool Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834,837, 979 P.2d

1192, 1195 (1999) On appeal, thls Court exercises fsce review over the entire lecord that was
before the district court in order to determine whether either party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Id.

B.

The District Court Erred in Concluding that the Fourth District Can Lawfully
Require Bail Agents to Submit to Criminal History Checks.
The district court correctly held that the character and fitness evaluation set forth in the

Guidelines constitutes a substantive licensing

~~~~~~~~~~e that exceeds the ADJ's authority over

to make rules of procedure However.
the operation of the courts and the judiciary's ai~thor~ty
the district court esroneously reasoned that, because the DO1 does not require a criminal history
check on a yearly basis, the Guidelines could require criminal history checks in some
circumstances. This conclusion is inconsistent with the district court's holding that licensing bail

agents is within the province of the legislature and that the character and fitness of the individual
bail agent executing the bail bond on the surety's behalf is unrelated to the operation of the
courts. Accordil?gly,this Court should reverse the district court's declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction insofar as it permits the Fourth District to require a criminal history check

in conjunction with a bail agents' placement on the authorized list.

1.

The authority of the courts

The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive laws intlte Legislature. I I re
~
SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,255 912 P.2d 614,623 (1995), citing Idaho Const. art. III,
1 The judiciary's rule making power thus goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules.
IIZre SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255 912 P.2d at 623; State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,
863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992). Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and
punishments for violations thered by creating, defining and regulating primary rights whereas
procedural I-ulesare those pertaining to ihe mechanical operation of the courts by which
substailtive laws, rights and remedies are remedied. Stcite v. Cmringtorz, 108 Idaho 539, 541,
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985). "Just as Article I1 of the Idaho ~onstitutionprohibits the Legislature
from usurping powers properly belonging to the judicial department, so does that provision
prohibit the judiciary from improperly invading the province of the Legislature." Irz ve SRBA
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255 912 P.2d at 623.
Fixing bail relates to the manner of ensuring that the alleged offense' will be heard by the
couit and, thus, is a procedural matter within the inhel-ent discretion of the courts. Curringtolz,
108 Idaho at 541,700 P.2d at 944. In exercise of its discretion, a court determines the amount
and conditions of bail after considering a number of factors relevant to the defendant's likelihood

of appearing as ordered and rlsk of poslng a safety threat to the community if released from
custody. See I.C.R. 46(c) A ci~minaldefendant may then post ball by tiling any one of three
enumerated "sufficient sureties": (1) a bail bond; (2) a property bond; or (3) a cash deposit. LC.

3

19-2907(1); see also I.C.R. 46(f)(l) "The court shall not require that ball be posted only in

cash, nor shall the court specify differing amounts for ball depending upon whether ~tis posted in
the form of cash deposit, a property bond, or a bail bond." I.C.R. 46(f)(1); see also I.C.

5

19-2907(2). Surety companies meeting requirements set forth by the DO1 are authorized to
become the sole surety on bail bonds and all courts and judges "shall accept and treat such bond"
as "fully and completely complying" with the requirements of law. I.C. 3 41-2604.

2.

The character and fitness evaluation provided in the Guidelines is not
procedural.

To procure placement on the authorizecl list, a bail agent must submit to a character and
fitness e\~aluation.According to'the Administrative Order promulgating the Guidelines, ihe ADJ
provided for this bail agent regulation because "it is in the best interest of the general public and
the court to ensure that persons or entities who are permitted to present Tor acceptance of bail
bonds . . . possess qualifications of good character and conduct their business in an ethical,
prompt and law-abiding manner." R. (Vol. 11) pg. 342.
However, it is within the province of the state legislature, under the broad concept of
police power, to enact laws concerning the health, safety and welfare of the people. State v.
Koller, 122 Idaho 409,410, 835 P.2d 644,645 (1992). The legislature's police power includes
the authority to regulate the right to pursue an occupation for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. See Jones

1).

State Bd of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 868, 555

P.2d 399, 408 (1976). Pursuant to this inherent authority,'the legislature enacted statutes
providing for the licensing of bail agents, which includes a character and fitness evaluation.
The Fourth District argues that the good moral character of an individual bail agent is
related to the procedural function of fixing bail because "the critical factor in assuring that the
accused returns to the court at the appointed time is the bail agent to whom the accused is being
released." App. Exli. 14 (ADJ Darla Williamson Affidavit 8-14-07) fl 14. As noted by the
district court, the ADJ's contention that the individual bail agent has the "duty to monitor and
supervise the accused after release on bail." (App. Exh. 14 (Williamson Affidavit 8-14-07) fl 14)
is not provided for by law. Instead, the only obligation undertaken by the bail bond is for the
corporate surety to pay the amount of the bail bond if the accused fails to appear. R. (Vol. 111)
pg. 470; see also App. Exh. 37 (Peter.Botz Affidavit 9-5-08), Exh. B-1 (Bail Bond). The district
court reasoned that the Fourth District "fail[s] to even suggest why . . . a surety bond posted by a
couporation specifically authorized by law to be the sole surety on a bail bond, requires that the
agent

oE the corporate surety be of good moral character, as determined by the ADJ, but that there

is no good character determination for the criminal defendant or other individuals posting a cash
bond." R. (Vol. In) pg. 469-70.
The district coilst correctly concluded that the "Guidelines create an additional
substantive licensure procedure that more than duplicates the licensure pvocedure provided by the
DOI." R. (Vol. In) pg. 470. Thus, "the bulk of the licensure procedure 'creates, defines, and
regulates primary rights' of bail agents in violation of Idaho Const. art. 111, 3 1." Id. The district
court enjoined those provisions of the Guidelines that permit the TCA to deny a bail agents'
application for placement on the authorized list or to seek their removal from the list, based on a

character and fitness evaluation, including the results of the crlminal history check.

3.

The criminal history check is not procedural.

Although the district court concluded that the Guidelines' llcenstng procedure is

substantive in nature, the district court reasoned that
The [Fourth District] correctly point[s] out that the DO1 does not investigate
whether a bail agent applicant is related by blood, marriage or adoption to any
judge or person employed in a court-related position. Once an individual is
licenced, the DO1 does not require as part of its renewal process any additional
criminal history fingerprint checks.

R. (Vol. III) 465. The district court found that "some of the provisions of [the Guidelines]
supplement the Iicensure requirements of the DO1 and to the extent they do not duplicate the
character and fitness evaluations conducted by the DO1 they are not violative of the separation of
powers doctrine and are within the authority of the ADJ." R. (Vol. 111) pg. 480. The district
court thus held that "as the DO1 relies on self repo~tingof problems, I.C. § 41-1021, the criminal
history record fingerprint check for an individual's initial application to be on the list after the
iirst year of their DO1 licens~~re
as a producer or for renewal placement on the list of authorized
bail agents is within the authority of the ADJ." R. (Vol. III) pg. 481
The district court erred in concluding that the ADJ could impose requirements on bail
agents seeking placement on the authovized list so long as those requirements did not directly
duplicate the character and fitness evaluations conducted by the DOI. Rather, the ADJ's
authority is limited to matters concerning the operation of the district courts. See LC. 5 1-907
(ADJ has administrative supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts).
Because the bail agent's criminal history has no direct bearing on the operation of the courts, it is
outside the scope of the ADJ's authority to require bail agents to submit to a criminal history

check as a requirement to executllig ball bonds tn the Fourth D~stnct
S ~ m ~ lto
a rstatutes regulating other professions, the DO1 requtres ball agents to repoil any
subseque~ltcriminal hlstory. See LC. 5 41-1021. A ball agent who falls to report a new criminal
charge is subject to discipline, up to and including revocation of the bail agent's license. See LC.

S 41-1016 (DO1 may icvoke, suspend or refuse to issue license where bail agent violates any
provision of Title 41). These statutes represent the legislature's exercise of its police power to
protect the public by ensuring the ongoing fitness of bail agents. It is not the Fourth District's
role to create additional substantive requirements for bail agents because it believes existing law
is inadequate. See Pernzit No. 36-7200 1). Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853
(1992) (the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of statutes are q~~estions
for the Legislature
alone). Determining the character and fitness of bail agents is an appropriate exercise of the
legislature's police power and regulating that character and fitness is not a procedural function
within the court's rule-making authority.
The only potential use for a criminal history check is to evaluate the character and fitness
of bail agents. The district court correctly determined that the ADJ may not require bail agents to
submit to a character and fitness evaluation and that the substantive licensing procedure set forth
in the Guidelines is unlawful. It necessarily follows that the Fourth District cannot require bail
agents to submit to periodic criminal history checks as a condition of their placement on the
authorized list. Accordingly, this Coult should reverse Paragraph Five of the declaratoiy
judgment and permanent injunction.

C.

The District Court Erred in Determining That the Guidelines Provide Arlequate
Procedural Due Process with Regard to a Rail Agent's Removal Following the
TCA's Determination That the Agent Has Not Timely Rectified a-Violation
Permitting the TCA to Remove the Agent from the Authorized List.
'The due process clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit state

government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. To
determine whether the government has violated a person's right to due process, courts must first
decide whether the threatened interest is a liberty or property interest within the scope of the due
process clause. Mareslz

1).

Stcite qf'lclaho Dep'l ofHealth aizd Welfare, 132 Idaho 221, 226, 970

P.2d 14, 20 (1998) Once a protected Interest is identified, courts determine the process due by
weighing three factors: (1.) the interests that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation and the pl-obative value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest. Mc~rhewsv. Elclridge, 424 U.S. 31.9, 334-35 (1976); Spencer v. Kooleizai
County, 145 Idaho 448,454, 180 P.3d 487,493 (2008).
Here, the district court correctly determined that the Guidelines are "sufficiently similar
to a licensing scheme" that "a propcrty right attaches" to a bail agents' authorization to post
bonds in the Fourtll District. R. (Vol. 111) pg. 484. In addition to this property interest, the
Guidelines regulate the Bail Plaintiffs' protected interest in pursuing their chosen occupations in
the Fourth J~tdicialDistrict. Thus, this Court should affirm the district court's conclusion that
"the bail agent is entitled to due process in any proceeding to add or remove him or her from" the
authorized list. R. (Vol, ID) pg. 484.
However, instead of applying the established three-factor balancing test identified in
Matlzews to determine the process due, the district court cited to the "facial" and "as applied"

analyses utilized to determine if a statute is unconstitutional. Further, Section 1 4 ( 1 ) ( ~of
) ~the

'

Guidelinespermits the TCA to remove a bail agent withoutprior notice following the TCA's
unilateral determination that the bail agent failed to timely rectify a violation identified in a
prevlous notice. Although a ball agent can contest the alleged v~olatlonbefore removal, the
Guldellnes provide for nelther notlce nor an opportun~tyto contest the TCA's rejection of an
agent's attempt to "rectify" the violation. In these situations, the Guidelines fail to provide for

rnennir~&cl
notlce or the opportumty to be heard at a nzeaizing/iil ttme. Accordmgly, thls Court
should reverse the poition of the district court's opinion denying the Bail Plaintiffs' request for a
declaration that the Guidelines violate procedural due process.

1.

The district court correctly determined that the Guideliiles' create a property
interest.

Due process protects interests created by statutes, rules and contracts. Board of Regents
v. Rotlz, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Scott v. Buhl Joirzt Sc11,oolDistrict No. 412, a 3 Idaho 779.

784-85, 852 P.2d 1376, 1381-82 (1993). To determme whether a person has a protected interest
in such a benefit, courts must examine the relevant statute, rule or agreement and the natnrc of
k Dep't o f Health and Welfnre, 103 Idaho 151, 154-55, 645 P.2d 891,
the interest at stake. ~ r u v.

In enacting tlie Guidelines' licensing procedure, the Foirrth District created an expectation
regarding placement on the authorized list. The Guidelines provide specific criteria for

Although the district court enjoined Section 14(I)(B)(l) and (B)(2), which permit
summary removal after a hail agent fails to "rectify" a violation involving nonpayment of a
forfeiture, it did not enjoin Section 14(I)(B)(3),which permits summary removal in the event a
bail agent fails to timely rectify a violation involving submission of renewal materials, including
a criminal history check.

placement on and removal from the list, which the Bail Plaintiffs' reliance on cannot be
arbitrarily undermined. Accordingly, in addition to their protected interest in occupational
liberty, discussed infru, the Bail Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in their placement on
the authorized lxst of agents.
In thelr appeal, the Fourth Distnct contends that "whlle a ball agent may have a protected
property interest in hislher statewide license, a bail agent does not have a protected property
interest in compelling the Fourth Judicial District to do business with hidher." Appellant's Brief
pg. 16-17 (emphasis in original). However, the Guidelines approval and regulation process for
bail agents is substantially identical to DO1 licensing - the only distinction is the geographic
scope of the authorization. The Guidelines' licensing procedure permits the ADJ and TCA to
determine, on the basis of general, subjective criteria, whether a bail agent is swfficiently ethical
and competent.
The dlctates of d ~ i eprocess apply not only to the legislature and agencles but. also, to
other subdivisions of state government. See State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 741, 170 P.3d 881,
884 (2007) (protections of procedural due process apply to drug court); Lowder v. Minidoku
County Joint School Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 839,979 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1999) (school
district violated procedural due process). Thus, in creating an expectation of a benefit - the
ability to execute bail bonds in the Fourth District - the Guidelines create a propeity interest in
placement on the authorized list.
In arguing that bail agents do not have a protected interest in placement on the list, the
Fourth District relies heavily on its contention that bail agents do not have a protected interest in
"doing business with a particular judicial district." Appellant's Brief pg. 19; see also Appellant's

Brief pg. 17. IHowever, individual bail agents and the Fourth District do not "do business"
e an accused and
together. A ball bond "IS a suretyship contract between thc state on one s ~ d and
his or her surety on the other slde, whereby tlze surety guarantees the appearance of an accused."

State v Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116,952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998).
The reference to "state" as a party to the bail bond contract reEers to the same party that is the
plaintiff in the criminal action against the defendant and does not refer to the court. R. (Vol. IlI)
pg. 483. Bail agents offer a retail service to the public by selling bail bonds to criminal
defendants, which bind a surety insurance company to pay the face amount o i the bond in the
event the defendant fails to appear. Neither the court nor the bail agent are a party to the bail
bond contract. The coulls and the bail agents do not "do business" together.
Even if bail agents were regarded as contractors providing a service to the courts.
procedural due process limits the Fourth District's ability to uefilse to place bail agents on the
authorized list. See Loivcler, 132 Idaho at 839,979 P.2d at 1I97 (because law gave teachers a
right to renew their contracts for the same length and pay as their cul~entcontracts, the teachers
had a property right in their extra day assignments); Scott, 123 Idaho at 784-85, 852 P.2d at
1381-82 (under a competitive bidding statute providing for the award of the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder, the lowest bidder has a property interest in the award of the contract)
The district court correctly determined that bail agents have a property interest, protected
by proced~lraldue process, in placement on the authorized 11st. Therefore, contrary to the Fourth
District's arguments in their appeal, this Court should affirm the district court's conclusion that
bail agents are entitled to due process in any proceeding to add or remove him or her from the
authorized list.

2.

Bail agents have a protected interest in engaging in their chosen occupations
in the Fourth District.

Liberty, as protected by due process, must be interpreted broadly and certainly
encoinpasses the right of persons to contract and to engage in their chosen occupation. Roth, 408
U.S. at 572. It is well-established that the right to pursue an occupation is protected by due
process. See Sclzware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,238-39 (1957); H & V
Erzgineerirzg, Irzc. v. ldaho State Bd. o f of Professioizal E~zgiizeersand Land Surveyors, 113
Idaho 646,649, 747 P.2d 55,58 (1987); Tumn 1). Board ofNursiizg, 100 ldaho 74,77, 593 P.2d
711, 714 (1979). Therefore, the Bail Plaintiffs have a protected interest in pursuing their
profession, apart froill their property interests created by the licensing procedures of $he DO1 and
the Guidelines.
The Ijou~thDistrict asserts that the Bail Plaintiffs do not. have a protected interest in
offering bonds in a particular jiidicial district. See Appellant's Brief pg. 19. However, regardless

oE whether the Bail Plaintiffs' right to occupational liberty is being regulated by a subdivision of
the state judicial branch or the state legislatufe, that interest cannot be deprived without the
procedural protections required by due process. Just as the DO1 regulates bail agents for the
protection of the public through state-wide licensing, the Fourth District regulates bail agents for
the protection of the public within a judicial district. See R. (Vol. 11)pg. 342 (promulgating
G~iidelinesregulating bail agents because it is in the best interest of the public to ensure bail
agents are ethical and law abiding).
Due process prohibits the unreasonable deprivation of protected interests, whether the
government entity causing the deprivation is the state legislature, county official or court or other

subdivision of that state government. Thus, where the judiciary deprives a bU1 agent from the
right to engage in his or her chosen occupation, it must meet the requirements of due process.

State v. AAAAarorz's Action Agency Bail Boizds, 993 S.W.2d 81,85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)
(concluding court order denying right to write bail bonds in county court must meet requirements
of procedural due process).
The Ball Agents have a protected niterest 111 practlc~ngthe11 professions The Fourth
District thus caiiiiot prevent bail agents from practicing their professions without providing the
procedural protections required by due process.

3.

Due process requires notice of and a n opportunity to contest the TCA's
determination that a violation has not been rectified.

In determining that the Guidelines complied with due process, the district court discussed
the "on it's face" and "as applied" analysis utilized to determine whether a statute is
consiitutional. R. (Vol. III) pg. 485. However,this analysis was not appropriate in the
procedural d ~ i epi-ocess context. Instead, once a protected interest is identified, the proper
analysis for determining the amount of process dne is the three-factor balancing test identified in

Matlzews. See S~,eizcer,145 Idaho at 454, 180 P.3d at 493; Neighbors for a I?lealtlzy Gold Fork v.
Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007); Rogers, 144 Idaho at 741, 170
P.3d at 884; Lo~ider,132 Idaho at 840,979 P.2d at 1198. Thus, to determine the process due,
courts weigh: ( I ) the interests that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or

substitute requirements would entail. Mathews, 424 U S. at 334-35; Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454,

When this analysis 1s applicd and the ball agents' mterest in continued placement on the

authorized list is welghed aganst the Fourth District's interest in redundant cnminal history
results, it is apparent that the pre-hearing removal of Mr. Garske and 38 other agents in 2006 did
not comply with the requirelnents of procedural due process. Accordingly, t h ~ Court
s
should
enjoin enforcement of the sectlons of the G~udeltnesthat authorized that removal
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
rnearzirzgful time and in a rneanirzgful manner. Mnthews, 424 U.S. at 333; Paul

1).

Board of

Professiorznl Disciplirze, 134 Idaho 838, 843, 11 P.3d 34, 39 (2000). For the opportunity to be
meaningful, a person must he given a hearing before being deprived of any significant protected
interest, except for extrnovdiizary circumstances where some valid government intel-estj~~stifies
postponing a hearing. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71 n.7; F~teiztesv. Slzevirz: 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
The prior opportunity to be heard prevents substantively tinfair and simply mistaken deprivations
of protected interests. Fuerzte.~,407 U.S. at 81. No later hearing and no damage award can ~ ~ n d o
an arbitrary taking and the proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone cannot be
used.to justify state action in the due process inquiry. Id.
The TCA's receipt of Mr. Garsl~e'sredundant criminal history results do not qualify as
an extraordinary circumstance justifying the pre-hearing removal of Mr. Garske and the thiityeight other bail agents. In Mr. Garske's f o ~ t yyears in the bail bond business, he has never been
subjected to disciplinary proceedings. App. Exh. 8 (Garske Affidavit 7-10-07) 2 2 , 4 , 7 . In
response to the TCA's January 3, 2006 violation notice, Mr. Garske submitted a renewed bail

agent application in whlch he affirmed he not been charged with any crimes and a recelpt
ind&ating he had submitted to a criminal history check at ISP. Pa~ticularlygiven the significant
interest Mr. Garske and hls subagents had in continued placement on the authorized l ~ s tthe
,
TCA's receipt of Mr. Garske's cnm~nalhistory results from ISP falls well short of the
extraordina~yc~rcumstancesthat can justlfy a pre-heanng deprivation.
In add~tionto balanc~ngthe private and government Interests at stake, courts should
weigh the risk of erroneous deprivation and the costs and benefits associated with additional
procedural safeguards. Here, had Mr. Garske known that hls cnmlnal history results had not
arrived from ISP pnor to hls removal, he could have attempted to track those results down and
p ~ o v ~ them
d e to the TCA Rather than slmply notlfylng Mr. Garske of the problem, two TCA
staff members spent an entire afternoon removing Mr. Garslze and the thirty-eight agents from the
antiiorlzed list. Because the removal occurred after 5:00 p.m. on the Friday before a holiday
weekend, by the time Mr. Garskc became aware the TCA was missing the criminal history results
it was too late for hiin to rectify the problem. In this situation, the additional procedural
l d created less administrative burden than the actual deprivation,
safeguard - notice - w o ~ ~have
which involved an entire afternoon of labor for two staff members.
The Fourth District has continually asserted that the Guidelines provide an opportunity
for a hearing prior to removal from the list. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 19 n.4. However,
although a bail agent can request a hearing upon receipt of a violation notice such as the January

3,2006 notice to Mr. Garslte, the Guidelines provide For neither notice of, nor an opportunity to
contest, the TCA's unilateral determination that a violation has not been timely rectified. Upon
receipt of the January 3 violation notice, Mr. Garske attempted to comply by rectifying the

violation, rather than contesting the violation notice by requesting a heaing. Through,the TCA's
interpretation oT Section 5, the criminal history results must arrive directly from TSP and will not,
be accepted from the bail agent. Therefore, Mr. Garslze had no reason to suspect that the TCA
had not received the criminal history ~.esults.Because the Guidelines did not require the TCA to
notify Mr. Garslce that 11perceived his coinpliance as inadequate, nearly forty people were
erroneously put out of work for four days Moreover, as to the thirty-e~ghtother bail agents, they
were not copied on the January 3 letter and, thus, had no notice of the "violation" that caused
them to be put out of work for four days. See App. Exh. 26 (Diane Burrell Affidavit 8-21-08),
Exh. I (January 3,2006 violation notice).
Due process certainly entitles a bail agent who attempts to "rectify" a "violation" found
by the TCA within the allotted time frame to meaningful notice and an opportnnily to be heard if
the TCA's office determines that the bail agent's attempt to comply was inadequate. In other
words, prior to removal from the list, the TCA's office must notify the bail agent that compliance
has been insufficient and allow him or her to request a hearing in front of the ADS to contest the
TCA's unilateral determination.
Application

oC the Mathews balancing test establishes that the procedures for summary

removal in Section 14(I)(B) violate procedural due process as a matter of law. Accordingly, the
Bail Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment in their favor enjoining the Fourth District from
enforcing those summary removal provisions and the district court erred in its contrary
conclusion

I

I

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Ball Plamt~ffsrespcctfully ask that this Court reverse
paragraph five of the Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, insofar as it allows the
Fourtli District to require bail agents to submit to a criminal history check. The Bail Plaintiffs
further ask the Court to revetse the district court's partial denlal of ihels summary judgment
motion based on the drstslct court's conclusion that the Guldehnes comply wlth procedural due
process.
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